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I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANCE OF BRITAIN
A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American
public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why
would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means
paradigm -- the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally
characterizes the modern corporation — reigned supreme.1 Shareholder
passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern
industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face
shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's
shares.
A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses
have recently been offered to explain shareholder passivity. According
to a new "political" theory of corporate governance, financial institutions
in the United States are not naturally apathetic but rather have been
regulated into submission by legal rules that — sometimes intentionally,
sometimes inadvertently — hobble American institutions and raise the
costs of participation in corporate governance.2
The principal policy implication of this new political theory of the
American corporation is obvious: deregulate in order to lower the costs
of coordination among shareholders. Relaxing various legal restrictions
and barriers — including the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibition against
combining commercial and investment banking and federal securities
rules that chill group formation by institutional investors — would
significantly enhance the ability and incentives of institutional investors
to monitor corporate managers. This is an important claim, but also one
not easily tested.
The new political theory of the corporation has not, however, won
universal acceptance. Although agreeing that American institutional
investors are in some respects overregulated and thereby chilled from
fuller participation in corporate governance, other scholars have doubted
that legal restraints can serve as the central pillar of a revised theory of
shareholder passivity.3 In contrast to the political theorists, who focus on
regulatory barriers that raise the costs of participation in corporate
1
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
2
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520
(1990); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10
(1991).
3

See, e.g., LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 209 - 33
(1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991).
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governance, these critics respond that existing incentives — particularly
those of fund managers — are too weak to motivate active institutional
monitoring, even if regulatory barriers were reduced.4 The attractions
(real or imagined) of the exit option of selling into a liquid securities
market further reduce the likelihood that even large shareholders will
organize to resist management.
The two authors of this article have been on opposite sides of this
debate, but both recognize that no single explanation is complete and
that other factors, such as the self-interest of fund managers, the conflicts
of interest faced by institutions who want to retain corporate business,
cultural forces, collective action problems, and what we can call path
dependence — the difficulty of changing the structure and behavior of
highly evolved and specialized institutions — have causal roles in
explaining shareholder passivity.5 The central question in research on
American corporate governance is how these forces interact to produce
the characteristic passivity of most American institutions.
The debate between the proponents and critics of a political theory
of American corporate governance is in some respects untestable. We
cannot run the legal experiment of changing our laws to facilitate
institutional oversight of corporate managers and observe how the
institutions act. Still less can we go back sixty years or more, change our
laws then, and see how the institutions would act if they had grown up in
a different legal and political environment. In similar settings, however,
social scientists have long used "natural experiments" to gain insight into
how a particular legal rule affects behavior across otherwise similar
societies.6 Comparative study of corporate governance in other
industrialized countries offers insight into how American corporate
governance might have developed under a different legal regime and
how governance practices might change if legal rules were changed
today.

4

Both sides in this debate agree, however, that many regulatory barriers to shareholder
collective action should be reduced or removed. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the
Institutional Investor: A Half- Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (1994).
5
For an effort to develop a multicausal statement of the political model, see Bernard S.
Black, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Case for Institutional Voice, J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1992, at 19, 21- 24.
6

The best-known — and most controversial — context in which natural experiments have
been used to inform a policy debate has been the debate over capital punishment. Scholars have
looked to the crime rate in contiguous — and presumably similar — American jurisdictions, one
having the death penalty and one not. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 263 -70 (1973). Without entering that
debate, our approach in focusing on the United Kingdom is similar in nature.
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To explore whether the paradigm American corporation, with its
strong managers and widely dispersed shareholders, could be a product
of American politics and the path-dependent evolution of American
financial institutions, scholars have recently examined corporate
governance in Japan and Germany, where commercial banks and, to a
lesser extent, insurance companies control large equity stakes and
sometimes closely monitor managements.7 The merits of these bankcentered systems, compared to more market- centered systems (such as
those in the United States and the United Kingdom), and the
transportability of bank-centered monitoring to other cultures and
economic environments, have fueled a stimulating debate that will
occupy corporate law scholars for some time to come.
At this point, our interest in the United Kingdom begins to come
into focus. The role of financial institutions in corporate governance in
the United Kingdom has attracted much less attention than the role of
German and Japanese banks.8 Yet the United Kingdom has unique
advantages for the effort to put American corporate governance in
comparative perspective and to understand how it might be improved
and what role legal rules and other factors play in shaping our system of
corporate governance. The legal culture of Britain is as similar to our
own as we are likely to find; in Britain, like the United States and unlike
most of the rest of the world, most large corporations are public and not
family-controlled; the United Kingdom has long had a liquid securities
market; the British "City" has the same array of financial institutions that
we do (commercial banks, insurers, mutual funds, investment banks,
private and public pension funds); stock ownership in both Britain and
the United States has come in the last few decades to be dominated by
institutions; and, most centrally, financial institutions in the United
7
See, e.g., W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 53 - 81 (1991); Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate
Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1991); Coffee (1991), supra note
3; Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between
Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993); W. Carl Kester,
Governance, Contracting, and Investment Horizons: A Look at Japan and Germany, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Summer 1992, at 83; Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in
Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
8
Professor Paul Davies is an exception. See Paul L. Davies, Institutional Investors: A U.K.
View, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 129 (1991); Paul L. Davies, Institutional Investors in the United
Kingdom, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 257 (Theodor Baums,
Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 1994). See also JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING
GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 248 -343 (1994).
We have each considered corporate governance in the United Kingdom briefly in earlier work.
See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence,
39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 927-31 (1992); Coffee (1991), supra note 3, at 1309 -11.
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Kingdom are significantly less regulated than their American
counterparts — though less regulated does not mean unregulated. In
particular, Britain has no counterpart to the Glass- Steagall Act or to
U.S. restrictions on interstate banking, which limit the size and power of
American banks. Nor does it have our history of limiting stock
ownership by insurance companies or regulating collective shareholder
action.
Not only is the United Kingdom context similar to that of the
United States, but British patterns of corporate governance may
foreshadow future developments in the United States. The U.K. equities
market is considerably more institutionally dominated than the U.S.
stock market. U.K. institutions hold about two-thirds of all publicly
traded British stocks, while U.S. institutions only hold around half of
U.S. publicly traded stock.9 Shareholder concentration is also higher.
The twenty-five largest institutional shareholders hold an absolute
majority of the stock of many U.K. companies.10 For smaller U.K. firms,
the five largest institutional holders control 30% or more of the shares.
Prudential Corporation PLC, the largest British institutional investor,
alone holds about 3.5% of the entire British equity market.11 Several
other institutions are almost as large. Equally important, the world of
British institutional investors is close-knit. Communication among them
is easy and unregulated. This reduces the coordination costs and free
rider problems that plague collective action in the United States. In
short, Britain presents a model of what U.S. securities markets might
look like if U.S. institutional holdings continue to grow — and with
many fewer legal barriers to institutional investor participation in
corporate governance.
To understand the behavior of British institutional investors, we
relied partly on traditional written sources. But British institutions
typically act behind closed doors. Only a handful of exceptional cases
degenerate into a public battle between shareholders and managers. To
probe this hidden world of informal monitoring, we conducted a series
of interviews with senior officers in major British institutions.12
9

For British data, see HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, ECONOMIC TRENDS NO. 466,
THE 1992 SHARE REGISTER SURVEY (1992) [hereinafter 1992 SHARE REGISTER SURVEY]. For the
United States, see Financial Assets & Equity Holdings, BRANCATO REP. ON INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTMENT (Victoria Group, Inc., Fairfax, Va.), Dec. 1993, at 42 tbl. 11.
10

See Tony Jackson, The Institutions Get Militant, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 1991, at 18.

11

See R.E. Artus, Tension to Continue, in CREATIVE TENSION? 12, 12 (National Assn. of
Pension Funds, Ltd., 1990).
12

These interviews were conducted principally in the summer of 1992 and were arranged
with the very helpful assistance of Jonathan Charkham. Until his recent retirement, Mr.
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So what happens in this brave new world of limited regulation and
lower coordination costs? One central conclusion is that if Japan and
Germany show how American corporate governance might have
developed very differently under different legal rules, Britain shows how
American corporate governance might not look drastically different
under more limited regulation. Major British institutions intervene to
change management, but only a handful of times per year. Absent a
crisis, the institutions generally stay on the sidelines.
Legal rules do matter. British institutions are significantly more
active than their American counterparts. One likely reason is that
American institutions cannot act jointly and quietly, in the preferred
British pattern. In addition, poison pills, control-person liability, and
other barriers chill and often prevent American institutions from forming
coalitions, even in public. But differences in regulation alone cannot
adequately explain the British mix of institutional activism and passivity.
The costs of collective action remain considerable, money managers'
interest in governance issues varies widely, and the alternative of exit by
selling shares into the market remains demonstrably on money managers'
minds. Money managers typically intervene only when doing so will
improve their relative performance — when it will benefit their portfolio
more than their competitors'. Conflicts of interest cause some money
managers to shrink from open confrontation with corporate managers.
(British law does even less than U.S. law to control these conflicts.)
Ultimately, only a multifaceted explanation can capture the complex
environment in which institutional investors function in Great Britain.
Path dependence in the evolution of financial institutions may be
particularly important in understanding national differences in corporate
governance systems. Institutional behavior is significantly influenced by
Charkham was the Bank of England's in-house adviser on corporate governance matters. Due to
promises of confidentiality, we cannot directly quote or identify the sources of specific comments
on which we rely below. Among the fund managers and investment personnel interviewed were:
Huw M. Jones, chief investment officer at Prudential Portfolio Managers (Britain's largest
institutional investor); L.E. (Paddy) Linaker, chief executive of M&G, probably the most activist
British mutual fund family; Paul Myners, chief executive at Gartmore Investment, currently the
largest U.K. money manager; Charles Nunneley, the chief executive at Robert Fleming Asset
Management; E. Michael Sandland, chairman of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee and
chief investment officer for Norwich Union, a large insurer; and Dr. Paul Whitney, chief
investment officer of CIN Management, which is the in-house fund manager for the British coal
pension funds. All were interviewed in face-to- face meetings by Professor Coffee, except for
Sandland, who was interviewed by telephone. For a recent newspaper account, describing several
of these individuals as among the most significant actors in the British institutional investor
community, see Patrick Weever & Topaz Amoore, Corporate Assassins: poor performers
beware, the institutions are gunning for you, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 17, 1993, City Section,
at 5 (listing recent instances in which chief executives have been replaced as the result of
institutional activism).
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the manner in which classes of institutions have evolved within a
particular country. For example, securities firms have different
organizational cultures, time horizons, and human capital than
commercial banks. The trading culture that develops in these firms
places greater emphasis on exploiting short-term market movements than
does the culture within a commercial bank, which is typically oriented
toward longer-term monitoring. In this light, it is relevant that British
securities firms are among the largest pension managers. Had pension
management instead developed as an offshoot of commercial banking,
pension managers might have adopted the longer time horizons and
greater interest in monitoring that banks generally exhibit.
To give another example, British banks invest a trivial percentage of
their assets in common stocks. Although there are several explanations
for why British banks shun investing in corporate equity, their
institutional history again may be instructive. Until well into this
century, British regulatory policy discouraged banks from growing too
large or owning sizable equity stakes. In contrast, government policies
in Japan and Germany encouraged the emergence of dominant national
banks and the establishment of close ties between banks and industrial
companies. This difference in history could partly explain why British
banks remain uninterested in holding equities, even though regulatory
obstacles to large equity holdings have been relaxed for some time.
In short, having developed one set of organizational skills under one
set of legal and political constraints, financial institutions are not so
malleable as to develop new skills quickly — at least unless they expect
substantial gains from the change. This leads to a further prediction: A
rapid increase in institutional activism would require the visible success
of a first mover, who engages in a high level of monitoring and achieves
a substantial payoff in portfolio performance. Such a success story
might cause institutions that now have a trading orientation to make the
investments in human capital and organizational redesign that would let
them compete with the first mover. Absent such a visible success,
change is likely to be gradual and incremental. This has been both the
American and the British pattern to date.13

13
An obvious example of how a successful first mover can influence the financial industry
is the success of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, & Co. and Forstmann Little & Co. in financing
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the early 1980s. The huge profits of the first movers inspired a
number of major investment banks to enter the LBO business, which involves intensive oversight
of managerial decisionmaking at a limited number of portfolio companies. But for most
investment banks, copying proved difficult. For Drexel Burnham and First Boston, LBOs became
a path not to profit but to huge losses.
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Although the British experience suggests limits on what legal
reform can do to encourage institutional oversight in the United States, it
also suggests that some feared dangers of greater institutional oversight
are exaggerated. For example, we find no evidence that British
institutions "micro-manage," meddle in day-to-day business decisions,
collude with each other to take advantage of minority shareholders,
foment price-fixing conspiracies, use their influence to extract special
concessions from corporations, or intervene in well-run firms. On the
contrary, institutional attention is a scarce resource that is allocated
mostly to problem firms.
The British experience also reinforces the danger of generalizing
about institutional investors. We need to understand each type of
institution separately, to assess the likely degree of institutional
involvement in corporate governance. British insurers are active, and
British pension funds are becoming active. Yet British banks are
uninterested in stock ownership. Although a few British mutual funds
are active monitors, most behave more like American mutual funds than
like British insurers. The multiplicity of institutions complicates the
comparative inquiry and makes our conclusions more tentative, but there
is no alternative.
We also find signs that the internationalization of capital markets is
leading to convergence in institutional investor behavior between the
United States and the United Kingdom — and perhaps more generally.
For example, some American institutions, having observed the common
British practice of separating the positions of chairman and chief
executive officer, are prodding American firms to take similar steps,
with some success.14 British institutions, having observed the prevalence
of audit committees and the dominance of outside directors on American
boards, are pressing for similar changes in British firms.15 Many British
institutions are also adopting the American practice of regularly voting
one's shares — and not always for management.
Our conclusion that moderate legal deregulation will produce
increased activism but will not — for better or worse — revolutionize
the behavior of American financial institutions is not far from the
conclusion that a British task force recently drew, after studying the
United States, Japan, Germany, and France:
14
See, e.g., Gilbert Fuchsberg, Chief Executives See Their Power Shrink, WALL ST. J., Mar.
15, 1993, at B1.
15

See OXFORD ANALYTICA LTD., BOARD DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
TRENDS IN THE G7 COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS 62 (1992) (describing increased use
of nonexecutive directors by large British firms); see also infra section II.B.4 (discussing the
efforts of PRO NED, the British Committee for the Promotion of Non-Executive Directors).
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[I]t is very doubtful whether the structure of the UK financial system
could be fundamentally changed. An examination of the origins of
systems of industrial finance shows them to be largely the product of
historical development; and targeted Government policy has played
only a minor role in the establishment of present day systems. Each
country's system has developed . . . [in response to] . . . the historical
and social structures of each country. . . . Any policy prescriptions for
the UK must be of a kind that can be built upon the existing system of
industrial finance.16

The implausibility of radical change does not mean that the more
modest change that legal reform might bring is unimportant. On the
whole, British institutional investors are considerably more interested in
corporate governance than most American institutions. Moreover, the
expectation of oversight is embedded in British culture. If the British
system does not work flawlessly, we think it works better at effecting
managerial changes and making boards of directors sensitive to
shareholder desires than do current practices in the United States.
Significant efficiency gains seem obtainable if American institutions
were more willing to press for change at troubled firms, in the way that
British institutions now do.
If the British model has some advantages, how do we get there from
here? We have relatively few answers to this critical question and a
strong sense that institutional structures are not easily transportable.
Radical transformation of our financial institutions is unlikely, even in
the absence of legal restrictions. For example, the British banks' lack of
interest in holding equities suggests that U.S. commercial banks, even if
deregulated, would not evolve into activist monitors. On the other hand,
American public pension funds, mutual funds, and insurers — probably
in that order of importance — could play a more constructive corporate
governance role, and Britain's experience suggests that legal reforms that
reduce barriers to institutional coalition formation would yield
measurable results.
Looking at Britain, we see a basis for tempered optimism about the
future of corporate governance in the United States. Institutional
oversight of corporate managers, both directly and indirectly through
boards of directors, can be improved. But, as we have suggested
elsewhere, a variety of legal reforms are necessary if institutional
oversight is to approach its potential.17 At the same time, shareholder
16
CBI (CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS.) CITY/INDUS. TASK FORCE, INVESTING FOR
BRITAIN'S FUTURE 32 (1987) [hereinafter CBI TASK FORCE REPORT].
17

See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 813 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Corporate Governance
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oversight needs supplementation by other constraints, including the
capital markets, the market for corporate control, the incentives provided
by management stock ownership, and fiduciary duties. Institutional
oversight is no more the magic bullet that will solve the performance
shortfalls of our major firms than takeovers proved to be in the 1980s.
II. A PROFILE OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTIONAL MARKETPLACE
We begin our study of the role of institutional investors in British
corporate governance with a survey of the major players — the principal
institutions, industry trade groups, and other bodies who define the
corporate governance landscape. We note, however, an important
caveat. Even more than in the United States, institutional investors in
Britain overlap conventional categories. There, as here, mutual funds
and insurers manage substantial pension assets. Moreover, Britain has
few of the regulatory firewalls that, in the United States, separate mutual
funds from insurers and commercial banks, and commercial banks from
investment banks. Insurers often run a separate mutual fund business
and vice versa; most commercial banks have investment banking
subsidiaries.
A. The Institutions
British firms, like their U.S. and Japanese counterparts, have
undergone a tremendous shift since World War II from individual
ownership of shares to institutional ownership. As late as 1957, British
financial institutions held only 18% of all British common stock
(ordinary shares in British parlance); this had grown to 60% by 1980 and
has remained roughly constant since then. Foreign holdings, which are
another 13% of the market, are also largely institutional holdings. A
breakdown by type of institution is shown in Table 1.18
Reform: 13D Rules and Control Person Liability, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1993, at 49;
Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1 (1992); Black (1990), supra note
2; Coffee (1994), supra note 4; Coffee (1991), supra note 3.
18
Table 1 is adapted from 1992 Share Register Survey, supra note 9. Other data sources
include RICHARD J. BRISTON & RICHARD DOBBINS, THE GROWTH AND IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS 139 exh. 13 (Institute of Chartered Accountants 1978) (reporting 1957-1970 data);
Erik Berglöf, Capital Structure as a Mechanism of Control: A Comparison of Financial Systems,
in THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES 237, 249 (Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gustafsson & Oliver
Williamson eds., 1990) (reporting London Stock Exchange data for 1980). For Japanese data, see
JAPAN SECURITIES RESEARCH INST., SECURITIES MARKET IN JAPAN 1992, at 68 tbl. 9 (1992)
(reporting that individual ownership declined from 61% in 1950 to 23% in 1989, while financial
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TABLE 1
OWNERSHIP OF BRITISH EQUITIES, 1963-1992

Type of Shareholder
Insurers
Pension Funds
Mutual Funds
Other Financial Institutions
Banks
All U.K. Financial Institutions
Nonfinancial Companies
Foreign
Non-Profit Entities
Government
Individuals

Dec. 31, 1963
10.0
6.4
1.3
11.3
1.3
30.3
5.1
7.0
2.1
1.5
54.0

Percentage Ownership
Dec. 31, 1981
Jan. 1, 1992
20.5
20.7
26.7
31.1
3.6
5.7
6.8
2.8
0.3
0.2
57.9
60.5
5.1
3.3
3.6
12.8
2.2
2.2
3.0
1.2
28.2
20.0

Below we describe each major type of institution and its share of
the total equity market. It is easiest to begin with a scorecard. As of
mid-1991, the twenty-five largest institutional investors were:19

institution ownership grew from 24.5% to 48%).
19

See Fiona Walsh, Sweeping Out the Boardrooms, SUNDAY TIMES (London), June 16,
1991, § 4, at 9.
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TABLE 2
THE TOP 25 BRITISH INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
No. Company

Type

1.
2.
3.

Prudential Corporation
Mercury Asset Management
Barclays de Zoete Wedd

Insurance
Merchant Bank
Merchant Bank

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Robert Fleming Holdings
Invesco MIM
Schroeder Investment Mgmt.
Standard Life
Postel Invesment Mgmt.
Lloyds Bank
Baring Investment Mgmt.
Commercial Union
Midland Montagu Asset. Mgmt.
Norwich Union Life Insurance
Legal & General
Royal Insurance
NM Rothschild Asset Mgmt.
County Investment Mgmt.
Friends Provident Life
Natl. Coal Board Pension Fund
Scottish Widows Fund & Life
Guardian Royal Exchange
Eagle Star Holdings
Sun Alliance
Kleinwort Benson Inv. Mgmt.
Trustee Savings Bank

Merchant Bank
Investment Manager
Merchant Bank
Insurance
Investment Manager
Commercial Bank
Merchant Bank
Insurance
Merchant Bank
Insurance
Insurance
Insurance
Merchant Bank
Merchant Bank
Insurance
Pension Fund
Insurance
Insurance
Insurance
Insurance
Merchant Bank
Merchant Bank

Asset Under
Management (£ billions)
57.7
56.3
46.0
45.3
38.6
36.3
32.2
32.0
28.4
25.9
25.7
24.1
24.0
24.0
23.7
22.3
22.3
20.5
19.8
19.4
19.2
19.0
17.0
15.5
15.3

The central message from Table 2 is that the structure of
institutional investment in the United Kingdom rests on retirement
savings. Most of the merchant banks and investment managers listed
above principally manage pension money. Only two of the ten largest
firms are insurance companies — and insurers also manage pension
accounts and sell investment products designed for retirement savings.
1. Insurance Companies
British insurers, like Japanese and German insurers,20 hold large
20
Japanese insurers held 17.3% of all Japanese equities in 1990, an insignificant change
from 17.5% in 1981. Jun Shirota, Why was the Japanese Stock Price Level High in the mid
1980s?: A Money Supply Hypothesis, 182 SHOKEN KEIZAI , Dec. 1992, at 27, 39 tbl. 4. German
insurers held 10.6% of German equities in 1990. Kester (1992), supra note 7, at 90. On the large
equity holdings of Allianz A.G. Holding, Germany's largest insurer, see David Waller, Allianz
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equity positions for their own account. In 1989, for example, British
insurers held common stock with a market value equal to 23% of their
total assets, a percentage that has fluctuated with market prices but
otherwise shown no apparent trend since 1965.21 Insurance companies
long were the largest single type of British institution in terms of their
equity holdings; they are now second in size to pension funds. As Table
1 shows, insurers' share of all equities has grown, from 10% in 1963 to
21% in 1992. But pension fund holdings have grown even faster, from
6% in 1963 to 31% in 1992.
The prominent role of British insurers is in sharp contrast to that of
American insurers. In 1990, the twenty largest American life insurers
had only 3.6% of their "common account" assets — assets held for the
insurer's own account — in common and preferred stock.22 As a result,
in 1992, American insurance companies — life insurers and
property/casualty insurers combined — held only 2.4% of American
equities.23
In addition to their direct holdings, British insurers, like their
American counterparts, manage large amounts of pension assets, though
we lack good data on exactly how much. British insurers were once the
dominant managers of pension assets.24 But, as Table 2 shows, they
have lost market share to merchant banks and independent money
disclosure helps clear fog, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at 24.
21
See BRISTON & DOBBINS (1978), supra note 18, at 127 exh. 5B, 128 exh. 7 (reporting that
between 1966 and 1975, insurer holdings of common stock varied between 20% and 27% of
assets measured at book value and between 14% and 44% of assets measured at market value;
1975 market value share is 26%); CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATISTICS 89-90
tbl. 7.10 (Dec. 1991) (reporting data for 1988 and 1989); CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFO., REFERENCE
PAMPHLET NO. 133, INSURANCE IN BRITAIN 23 (1979) [hereinafter INSURANCE IN BRITAIN]
(reporting that 29% of insurer assets were invested in common stock in 1977, based on book
value).
22
See Carolyn K. Brancato, Institutional Investors: A Widely Diverse Presence in Corporate
Governance tbl. 9 (Feb. 25, 1993) (working draft, Columbia Univ. School of Law Ctr. for Law
& Economic Studies, Columbia Institutional Investor Project). There are some inconsistencies
in Brancato's data. She reports that the entire life insurance industry held 9.1% of its assets in
common and preferred stock in 1990. This percentage is far higher than the 3.6% average for the
top 20. Yet the top 20 insurers held over half of all industry assets. Our judgment is that the top20 figure, which is derived from company-by-company data, is more likely to be accurate and that
the higher percentages for the entire industry probably include some managed assets. The British
data could suffer from similar confusion between direct and managed holdings. The data in Table
2 includes managed holdings.
23
24

See Financial Assets & Equity Holdings (1993), supra note 9, at 47.

See LESLIE HANNAH, INVENTING RETIREMENT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL
PENSIONS IN BRITAIN 73 (1986) (reporting that insurers had "built up a commanding market lead"
in pension fund management in the 1950s, but thereafter suffered "increasingly tough
competition" from a new "specialist pension profession" that could handle the administrative
details and a new "investment management" profession that could manage the funds).
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managers. British insurers also manage mutual funds, a business denied
to American insurers by law.25 Once again, we lack data on the size of
insurers' mutual fund business.
The British insurance industry is highly concentrated. Prudential,
the single largest British institutional investor, owns over 3.5% of the
entire British stock market.26 This dwarfs U.S. institutions, the largest of
which manages under 1.5% of all equities (with voting power even
lower). Indeed, in percentage terms, the largest American institutions
would not even make the British top ten.27
A closer look at Prudential conveys a better sense of the monitoring
capability of these large institutional investors. Prudential Portfolio
Managers Limited (PPM), Prudential's principal investment subsidiary,
manages a total portfolio of £45 billion, half of which is held for external
clients — chiefly pension funds. Of this portfolio, 43% (£19 billion) is
invested in U.K. equities. PPM estimated for us that at any one time it
held approximately 900 U.K. stocks. Its holdings included "virtually
every" corporation in the 100 largest British corporations, a group that
accounts for 70% of the capitalization of the British stock market. PPM
commonly holds a substantial stake in even the largest British
corporations. PPM estimated for us that it held a 5% or greater stake in
"probably 200 companies." When we asked how high they would go in
percentage ownership, its senior management acknowledged that it "gets
cautious at 10%," but currently held stakes of up to 14%. Concern about
illiquidity — being "locked in" in its parlance — was the principal
reason expressed for usually stopping at or near 10%.
One plausible reason why British, Japanese, and German insurers
hold more common stock than American insurers is that American
insurance regulation long forbade, and continues to restrict, American
insurers from holding large equity stakes.28 The British have nothing
comparable. Instead, the British system is based on " 'freedom with
publicity' — freedom for the insurers to determine their own . . .
investment and other policies in return for publicity about their financial
condition."29 Government Actuary's Department regulations require that
an insurer's assets, valued at market, equal 104% of liabilities. Insurers
25

See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1469, 1471-78 (1991).
26

See Artus (1990), supra note 11, at 12.

27

For a survey of the largest American institutional investors, see II 300: America's Top
Money Managers, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1993, at 105.
28
See Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the
Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639 (1993).
29

INSURANCE IN BRITAIN (1979), supra note 21, at 37.
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must meet this test assuming a 25% fall in equity values. But equities
are not disadvantaged compared to other risky investments. The 104%
test must also be met assuming a 25% fall in the value of real estate
holdings and a 3% rise in interest rates (which will reduce bond values).
Moreover, regulators have been flexible in market downturns. They
informally relaxed the 25% test in mid-1992 when a bear market brought
some insurers close to regulatory minimums, so that the insurers would
not have to dump stocks to meet the solvency test.30
British insurers are, on the whole, long-term investors. The annual
turnover rate for life insurers was roughly 15% per year in 1986, and
was below 10% as recently as 1980.31 In contrast, the average U.S.
institutional investor turns over its portfolio nearly once per year.32 Only
a limited number of heavily indexed U.S. pension funds and a few
exceptional U.S. money managers have turnover rates as low as the
typical British insurer.33 Moreover, British insurers rarely sell a major
position completely. If Prudential or Legal & General Group PLC,
another large British insurer, is a major shareholder today, it will
probably remain so for the foreseeable future. Thus, British firms know
that such a shareholder is a more or less permanent monitor.
2. Pension Funds
In Britain, as in the United States, pension funds have become the
largest single category of institutional investor, soaring from 3% of the
market in 1957 to 31% in 1992.34 Both the United States and Britain
30

See Norma Cohen, New ratios offer a reprieve to equities: The effect of relaxing portfolio
margins, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at 4. British insurers are also subject to European
Community minimum capital rules, but the regulations are not unduly strict. So far as we can tell,
common stock, valued at book value, counts toward the required minimum capital in the same
way as any other asset. The book value approach increases insurers' ability to hold common
stock. They will not violate the solvency rules simply because equity prices have dropped, as long
as prices recover before the stock must be sold or losses can be offset by also taking profits on
other holdings. For an overview of EC insurance regulation, see INSURANCE IN BRITAIN (1979),
supra note 21, at 41.
31

See CBI TASK FORCE REPORT (1987), supra note 16, at 22.

32

See LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND
THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 63-68 (1988) (noting an average annual turnover of 87% for all
U.S. equities, with institutional turnover higher still).
33

See, e.g., Dale M. Hanson, The Long-Term Perspective: One Institutional Investor's Point
of View, Address at the Current Investment Issues Seminar (Sept. 23, 1992) (transcript on file
with authors) (reporting that CalPERS has annual turnover of about 10% for the 80% of its
portfolio that is indexed). Note, however, that if the nonindexed 20% of CalPERS' equity
portfolio turns over at 100% per year, CalPERS total turnover would still be 28% [(0.10 × 0.80)
+ (1.00 × 0.20) = 0.28].
34

For 1957 data, see BRISTON & DOBBINS (1978), supra note 18, at 139 exh. 13. For 1992
data, see Table 1.
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have large corporate pension plans, fueled by legal requirements for
minimum funding and tax exemption for pension benefits. The British
have no strict analogue to our multiemployer pension funds, nor to our
public pension funds. Most public employee pensions are unfunded.
The principal British analogues to American public pension funds are
the large quasi-public plans covering the employees of formerly
nationalized industries, such as the £20 billion coal miners' plan run by
CIN Management and the Post Office and British Telecommunications
pension funds, which total £32 billion and are administered by Postel
Investment Management. In 1980, quasi-public plans held about 29% of
all pension plan assets, suggesting that they currently hold about 9% of
British equities.35 In contrast, Germany and Japan have minimal pension
fund assets.36
a. Corporate pension plans. Apart from funding rules, British
pension plans have been relatively unregulated. Pension plans are set up
as trusts, with the trustees governed principally by the common law of
trusts. This lets company officers pick the pension plan trustees. Often,
as in the United States, they pick themselves. British pension plans use a
mixture of inside and outside money managers. The trend, though, is in
the direction of outside managers, as suggested by the dominance of
pension fund managers among the largest investors.37
Corporate pension plans in Britain, like their American
counterparts, are relatively passive. But their passivity is not absolute.
Outside money managers face a tension between maximizing returns and
a conflict-of-interest- driven desire to keep a low profile with regard to
shareholder activism. Faced with a bad investment, they may quietly
support another major shareholder that takes the lead role in pressing for
35

See RICHARD L. DEATON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PENSIONS: POWER, POLITICS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN CANADA, BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 242 (1989).
36

In Germany, high government-funded retirement benefits leave less need for corporate
pension plans. The government plans are not funded. See Buxbaum (1991), supra note 7, at 10.
Until recently, most Japanese corporate pensions were unfunded. Recently adopted funding
requirements, however, imply that Japanese pension plans will become important over the next
couple of decades. Conversation with Dr. Hiroo Hojo, Senior Economist, Japan Securities
Research Institute (Feb. 26, 1993). We are not aware of data on the size of funded Japanese
pension plans. Cf. JAPAN SECURITIES RESEARCH INST. (1992), supra note 18, at 8-9 (not treating
pension funds as a separate type of financial institution). Funded pension trusts administered by
banks held an estimated 0.9% of Japanese equities in 1989. Id. at 10 tbl. 3.
37
The relatively unregulated state of British pension plans will likely change in the wake of
the Robert Maxwell scandal, in which Maxwell looted corporate pension plans to fund his firms'
operating losses. See, e.g., Bronwen Maddox, Like a thief taking $2B in the night, FIN. POST,
June 17, 1992, § 1 at 6. Some proposals, such as making at least some of the trustees independent
of the plan sponsor, see Protecting Pensions, ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 1992, at 15, will increase the
fund's independence and may lead to pension plans' becoming more active in corporate
governance issues.
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a change in strategy or management, happily sell their shares to a
takeover bidder, or take joint action that they would not take
individually, perhaps through the industry trade group, the National
Association of Pension Funds, Ltd. (NAPF). In some cases, outside
money managers will urge a change behind the scenes, a rarity in the
United States. 38
b. Quasi-public pension plans. In the United States, public pension
plans, and quasi-public plans like the College Retirement Equities Fund
(CREF), have been by far the most active institutions in the corporate
governance realm.39 The incentives of public fund managers to be active
monitors of corporate managers remain uncertain. Public fund managers
have weaker conflicts of interest than other institutions in opposing
corporate managers. But their incentives to monitor corporate managers
are limited. Public fund managers do not directly profit if the fund earns
a higher return. Many are heavily indexed, and thus will match the
market whatever they do. Although public fund managers point to their
fiduciary duty as the justification for their activism, some outside
observers worry that political motives, including the desire for favorable
publicity, underlie some public fund activism.40
The British example only deepens the puzzle. Traditionally, British
quasi- public employee pension funds have not been among the most
active shareholders. Although the Railway, Coal, and Postel plans have
been prominent in the recent British interest in American-style proxy
activism,41 they are less central in the behind-the-scenes oversight that is
more typical of British institutional efforts to date.42
38
See, e.g, Shareholders Taste Blood at Westinghouse, IBM, and American Express, CORP.
CONTROL ALERT (American Lawyer Media, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1993, at 1, 4 ("[P]rivate
money managers ... made a rare appearance ... when James Robinson tried to hang on as chairman
of the board of [American Express] ....").
39
See generally Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993).
40
For discussion of the incentives and motives of American public fund managers, see, for
example, WILLIAM M. O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND
POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 175 -205 (1992); Black (1992), supra note 17, at 878-81;
Coffee (1994), supra note 4, at 857-71; Romano (1993), supra note 39.
41

Telephone Conversation with Howard Sherman, Director, Institutional Shareholder
Services' Global Proxy Advisory Service (Mar. 25, 1993); see Richard A. Melcher & Patrick
Oster, Yankee-Style Activists Strike Boardroom Terror Abroad, BUS. WK., Mar. 15, 1993, at 74,
75 (Alastair Ross Goobey, CEO of Postel Investment Management, explains: "We see ourselves
playing a policeman's role."); Margaret Price, Governance Efforts Expanding to U.K., PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS , Sept. 30, 1991, at 3, 31 (noting that South Yorkshire Pensions Authority
Superannuation Fund joined a campaign to force Fisons PLC, a chemical and fertilizer
manufacturer, to change its method of peat harvesting in Yorkshire).
42

Our interviews with the two largest quasi-public pension advisers — Postel and CIN
Management, which manages the British Coal Pension Funds — suggest that they are eager to join
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3. Mutual Funds
Mutual funds are the third major British category of institutional
investor. British "investment trusts" and "unit trusts" correspond
roughly to American closed-end and open-end mutual funds,
respectively. The two together owned an estimated 11% of British
equities in 1990, up from about 6% in 1957, though not much changed
since 1972.43 This is similar to American mutual funds, which owned an
estimated 10% of U.S. equities in 1993.44 In contrast, Japanese and
German mutual funds are unimportant as institutional shareholders.45
There are sharp differences between mutual funds in their
involvement in corporate governance. Many British mutual funds are
largely passive. On the other hand, M&G Group, which is principally a
unit trust manager, is sometimes held out as a model of mutual fund
behavior. In 1992, M&G held 5% or greater stakes in 250 public
companies.46 M&G explains that its corporate philosophy includes longterm investing and active dialogue with corporate managers:
We believe strongly that, as an institutional investor, we should have a
constructive dialogue with the management of companies in which we
have a significant interest . . . . We take a long term view of
performance and we are not deflected by short term considerations.
We do not attempt to tell management how to run their businesses,
but, if a company's actions seem likely to jeopardise the interests of
shareholders, we find that constructive intervention can often be
preferable to disposing of our holding.47

In an interview with us, a senior M&G official estimated that it saw
the typical company in its portfolio two to three times a year. Still,
because M&G holds roughly 700 stocks, it can scarcely monitor each
portfolio company with probing intensity. Unlike other respondents in
and form shareholder coalitions. If they choose to use it, British quasi-public funds should have
significant influence. The Postel plan, for example, is larger in relative terms than any U.S. public
fund. See Melcher & Oster (1993), supra note 41, at 75.
43
For 1957 and 1972 data, see BRISTON & DOBBINS (1978), supra note 18, at 139 exh. 13,
144 exh. 20. For 1990-1991 data, see Kester (1992), supra note 7, at 90. We are not sure why
the recent Share Register Survey, reported in Table 1, reports mutual fund ownership of only 6%,
and suspect that some mutual fund assets are hidden within other categories in Table 1.
44

See Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 75,
76 n.1 (1993) (reporting Federal Reserve data).
45

Open- and closed-end investment trusts held 3.7% of Japanese equities in 1989. JAPAN
SECURITIES RESEARCH INST. (1992), supra note 18, at 10. This is far less than Japanese banks
and insurers. Germany has no significant mutual fund industry, apart from the trust business
conducted by the German universal banks.
46
See M&G GROUP PLC, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 3 (1992) [[hereinafter
M&G 1992 ANNUAL REPORT].
47

Id.
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our interviews, M&G told us that it seldom joins a coalition with other
investors. It limits itself to one-to-one discussions. This may partly
reflect M&G's tendency to invest in smaller companies, in which M&G
typically is a very influential shareholder. Thus, M&G may not need to
find other institutional allies.
British mutual funds trade less actively than their American
counterparts but far more actively than other British institutions. In
1986, mutual fund turnover averaged about 40%, compared to less than
20% for insurers and pension funds.48 Mutual fund managers also report
that they compete intensely over relative performance records. The
instinct of many mutual fund managers is to sell their shares in a
troubled firm, rather than try to turn it around. Still, as in the United
States, passivity is relative, not absolute, even for trading-oriented funds.
Mutual fund managers, like pension fund managers, occasionally press
for corporate change in a clear case.49
4. Commercial Banks
British commercial banks are like American commercial banks, and
unlike German and Japanese banks, in that they hold little stock directly.
As Table 1 shows, banks hold only 0.2% of British equities. This
compares with 0.3% ownership of American equities by American banks
in 1990-1991.50
Current regulation cannot explain the passivity of British banks.
From World War II until the late 1970s, the Bank of England did not
count equity holdings as part of the bank's required regulatory capital.
But this policy was substantially relaxed in the late 1970s. Yet the banks
seem uninterested in holding equity — for which we offer a multicausal
explanation in Part V.
American banks, though they hold little stock directly, are major
holders as trustees for wealthy individuals. Bank trusts held 7.3% of all

48

See CBI TASK FORCE REPORT (1987), supra note 16, at 22.

49

For U.S. examples, see Alison L. Cowan, Investors' Power Test at Borden, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1993, at D1; Kevin G. Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Activist Holders: Giant Investors Flex
Their Muscles More at U.S. Corporations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1992, at A1, A6 (describing
efforts by John Neff of Windsor Fund to convince Chrysler directors to find a new CEO to replace
Lee Iacocca). For a U.K. example, see John Gapper & Norma Cohen, A tour of investors buys
time for the bank, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at 19 (A mutual fund head, having met with
Barclays' CEO, explains: "I got the feeling he realises the level of dissatisfaction.").
50

See Kester (1992), supra note 7, at 90.
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American equities in 1992, though they are usually passive investors.51
In contrast, bank trust holdings are not even separately listed in Britain.52
The failure of British banks to utilize their legal authority to hold
equity is more striking because their merchant banking affiliates are
among the largest pension fund managers. British commercial banks
seemingly could combine their holdings as pension fund managers with
direct investments in order to wield influence disproportionate to the size
of their direct equity stakes. In Germany, a few large banks effectively
control many firms through a combination of direct holdings, stock held
as a nominee for individuals, and mutual fund holdings. In Britain, this
synergy has been exploited by insurers but not by commercial banks.
5. Investment Banks
British investment banks — "merchant banks" in the British phrase
— like their U.S. counterparts, hold little equity for their own account
but hold substantial stock as nominees for other holders, principally
individuals. British merchant banks also manage substantial mutual fund
and pension assets.
British investment banks have been more active in corporate
governance than their almost completely passive American counterparts.
As we discuss in Part IV, some merchant banks participate in
institutional coalitions and occasionally lead them. But, at the same
time, British investment banks play a much less prominent role than
insurers. As with commercial banks, multiple factors, explored in Part
V, interact to explain the degree of interest shown by investment banks
in corporate governance.
B. Self-Regulatory Organizations
The second central pillar of informal oversight, British style, is selfregulation through trade associations associated with each major type of
institution, plus committees and organizations that are set up from time
to time. Often these committees are joint projects between the "City" —
the British term for financial institutions of all types, many of which are
51
52

Financial Assets & Equity Holdings, (1993), supra note 9, at 47.

Some of the gap may be filled by the 2.4% of equities held in 1975 by "financial
companies other than banks, insurers, and mutual funds." See BRISTON & DOBBINS (1978), supra
note 18, at 147 exh. 22A. Perhaps, too, some trust holdings by banks are captured under the
catchall phrases "persons, executors, and trustees" or "other shareholders." See id. at 139 exh. 13,
141- 46 exh. 16-22.
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located in a small district in the City of London — and British industry.
We describe below the principal trade organizations and committees.53
1. Industry Trade Organizations
Each type of British financial institution (except commercial banks)
has its own trade organization — the Association of British Insurers
(ABI), the Institutional Fund Managers' Association (IFMA), the
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Association of
Investment Trust Companies (AITC), the Association of Unit Trust and
Investment Funds (AUTIF), and the British Merchant Banking and
Securities Houses Association (BMBA). The trade organizations serve
the classic lobbying function that one might expect, but they also serve
as a nexus for corporate governance activity.
The ABI, the NAPF, and the IFMA have each been active in recent
debates over corporate governance. The ABI has long fought to preserve
preemptive rights and has served as the forum for "case committees."
Historically, the case committee was probably the most important lowvisibility institution for negotiations between institutional shareholders
and corporate managers.54 When a public corporation neared insolvency
or faced some other long-term crisis, the ABI would assist in forming a
committee of the insurance companies holding the largest stakes in the
firm to meet with its board and typically negotiate changes in
management. Membership on the case committee was usually kept
nonpublic, as was the committee's existence, because its formation
would cast doubt on the corporation's solvency and could depress the
stock price if publicized.
The committee members understood
themselves to be barred from trading the corporation's securities, perhaps
because this could be viewed as insider trading. More recently, the
NAPF has also formed case committees of pension funds.
The case committee has declined in importance in recent years, and
most of our interviewees were skeptical about its contemporary utility.
Typically, case committees were viewed as "unwieldly," having too
many members to act quickly or decisively. Today, a firm's largest
shareholders, when they intervene, are more likely to form a loose
53
This section discusses the self-regulatory organizations that are important for corporate
governance issues. In addition, various self- regulatory organizations, created by the Financial
Services Act 1986, ch. 60, reprinted in main in 30 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
WALES 162 (4th ed. reissue 1991 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter HALSBURY'S STAT.], regulate
financial institutions but have not yet played a significant corporate governance role. See section
III.B.
54

See Davies (1994), supra note 8, at 273-74.
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coalition on their own than to set up a case committee through the ABI
or the NAPF. Also, some institutions might not want to join a case
committee as this would restrict their ability to sell. Finally, a committee
of only insurance companies or pension funds cannot speak for all
institutional investors, yet a pan-institutional committee would be even
more unwieldy. Nonetheless, our interviewees estimated that roughly
two to four case committees are still formed each year.
The NAPF and the IFMA have concentrated much of their attention
on encouraging shareholder voting. The IFMA, now chaired by Paddy
Linaker, the chief executive of M&G, recently urged that institutions
always vote shares held in a fiduciary capacity.55 The NAPF has also
developed model proxy forms that clearly authorize the fund manager to
vote the pension fund's shares. At present, whether the pension trustees
have delegated voting power to the fund manager is often unclear, even
to the parties involved. In addition, the NAPF has established a proxy
voting service to provide information on specific contests, without
recommendations, to its members.56 Both the NAPF and the ABI have
also prepared guidelines regarding executive pay, the length of directors'
contracts, and other corporate governance issues. Beyond forming case
committees, neither the ABI nor the NAPF becomes involved in disputes
at specific companies. Their activity level also depends on the identity
of their frequently rotating chairmen.
2. The Institutional Shareholders' Committee
In addition to these individual trade organizations, an umbrella
organization, the Institutional Shareholders' Committee (ISC), represents
all major financial institutions except commercial banks.57 The ISC was
originally formed in 1973 at the behest of the Bank of England.58 It
became moribund by the late 1970s, but was revived in the 1980s. In
theory, the ISC can wield more power than any one shareholder or trade

55
The IFMA recommended that its members vote their shares at a time when only 20% of
pension fund shares were voted at annual meetings. See British corporate governance: Punters'
progress, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1991, at 86 [[hereinafter Punters' progress].
56
See Norma Cohen, Survey of Pension Fund Investment, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at 8,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Fintme File.
57
58

The ISC's members are the ABI, the AITC, the BMBA, the NAPF, and the AUTIF.

See RICHARD DOBBINS & THOMAS W. MCRAE, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 5-6 (1975).
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group. In practice, "the individual cases in which it intervened in regard
to the composition of the board have been few and far between."59
When the ISC was revived in the late 1980s, its then-chairman,
Donald Brydon of Barclays, developed an ambitious agenda. Although
we were unable to interview Brydon, many of our interviewees
commented on his bold plans for the ISC — and what happened to those
plans. Uniformly described as highly successful and ambitious, Brydon
wanted the ISC to coordinate institutional investor intervention in
corporate governance disputes.
He succeeded in moving the
responsibility for forming case committees away from ABI and NAPF to
the ISC so that one unified committee could represent all institutions.
According to some, he envisioned an enhanced case committee system
under which the ISC might, for example, retain investment bankers to
develop alternative business plans, maintain lists of acceptable nonexecutive directors whom they would seek to elect when necessary, or in
a crisis obtain proxy authority from institutional investors. These
changes would replace a loose-knit coalition of institutional investors
with a single entity able to negotiate with management on a one-to-one
basis.
These changes did not come to pass. Brydon, it seems, was too far
ahead of his constituents. In 1990, the ISC chairmanship passed from
Brydon to Michael Sandland of Norwich Union, a leading insurer. As it
did, the ISC's goals shifted from company-specific intervention to
formulating general policy positions.60 One problem was the expense of
upgrading the ISC so that it could play an activist role. No one was
eager to pick up these costs. One insider told us that pension funds were
reluctant to give proxies to anyone other than their fund managers.
Others cited institutional rivalries within the ISC, with insurance
companies being reluctant to delegate power to Brydon, who was from a
merchant banking background.
Responsibility for forming case
committees has shifted back to the ABI and the NAPF. The ISC's selfdescription currently states that it "seeks to identify areas of common
ground amongst its members and thereafter to promulgate those jointly
held views. It does not normally become involved in matters concerned
with particular investments or companies."61
59
See Jonathan Charkham, Are shares just commodities?, in CREATIVE TENSION? (1990),
supra note 11, at 34, 41.
60
See Clare Dobie, Inside the City: Bridge between City and industry still unfinished,
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 4, 1991, at 23.
61
See COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (CADBURY
COMMITTEE), REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 64 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter CADBURY COMMITTEE REPORT ].
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The brief flowering and decline of the ISC as an activist body
suggests limited institutional capacity to undertake collective action.
There is a parallel between the ISC's limited role and the role played in
the United States by the Council of Institutional Investors, which was
recently described by its executive director as "a yappy dog nipping at
[management's] ankles."62 The broader the umbrella group, the harder it
is to achieve consensus, and the longer it takes to do so. This tends to
limit such groups to addressing structural matters, such as board
independence, that cut across many firms and are not time sensitive.
The ISC's unwillingness to take company-specific actions does not
mean that the ISC is unimportant. Its published statements (The Role
and Duties of Directors — A Statement of Best Practice and The
Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders in the UK63) both express
and reinforce the consensus among British institutional investors that
"[m]any institutions already have effective channels of communication
with the Boards of companies in which they invest" and that a "direct
relationship which enables directors and shareholders to obtain a deeper
understanding of each other's aims and requirements" is desirable.64 At
the same time, the institutions will normally support management. The
ISC explains: "[I]nstitutional shareholders [[ should] support Boards by
a positive use of their voting rights unless they have good reasons for
doing otherwise."65 Before casting an antimanager vote, the institution
should first discuss the matter with management and seek an informal
solution.66
3. Corporate Governance Reform and Boards of Directors
U.K. corporate boards are undergoing significant change. During
the early 1980s, only around 33% of the directors of British public
corporations were outside, or "non-executive." By 1989, this percentage
had climbed to 44%, and to 50% for corporations with sales over £500

62
See Council Seeks to Expand Membership Base, INVESTOR RESP. RES. CTR., CORP.
GOVERNANCE BULL., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 15, 15.
63
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS' COMMITTEE, THE ROLE AND DUTIES OF DIRECTORS — A
STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICE (1991) [hereinafter ISC, ROLE AND DUTIES OF DIRECTORS];
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS' COMMITTEE, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDERS IN THE UK (1991) [hereinafter ISC, RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDERS].
64

ISC, RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS (1991), supra note 63, at 1.

65

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

66

Id.
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million.67 Similarly, in 1980, only 13% of U.K. public companies had
audit committees; in 1990, this had risen to 45%. The percentage of
public companies with a remuneration committee rose from 36% in 1980
to 62% in 1990.68 Between 1991 and 1993, the percentage of the largest
100 British companies that had split the roles of chairman and chief
executive officer rose from 63% to 73%.69
The Cadbury Committee, named after its chairman, Sir Adrian
Cadbury, reflects the recent U.K. ferment over corporate governance.
The Cadbury Committee was formed in 1991 in the wake of the Polly
Peck scandal, in which Polly Peck, a major British firm, went bankrupt
after years of falsifying its financial reports. The Committee's role,
initially limited to preventing financial fraud, soon expanded to cover
corporate governance more generally in the wake of the BCCI and
Maxwell scandals. The Committee's 1992 report covers both financial
auditing and corporate governance and elicited controversy for its
corporate governance recommendations.70 Nonetheless, many of the
Committee's recommendations are likely to be implemented in light of
the support for the Committee's efforts from key institutions, including
the Bank of England, the Confederation of British Industry, and the
London Stock Exchange.
The principal Cadbury recommendations are: (i) the positions of
chairman and CEO should be separated, with the board chairman
monitoring the performance of management; (ii) firms should have at
least three nonexecutive directors, at least two of whom should have no
financial or other ties with management; and (iii) each board should
have an audit committee composed entirely of non-executive directors,
with a majority of independent non-executive directors.71 These
recommendations reflect common practice; the Committee wanted them
to become universal. The London Stock Exchange is expected to adopt
67
See Simon Holberton, Corporate governance: why the ideal board remains so elusive,
FIN. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at 10.
68

Id.

69

See Norma Cohen, Of hats and heads, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at 10. For recent
anecdotes, see id. (reporting that the two positions will be separated at BAT Industries); Norma
Cohen, Marshall 'might quit' if curbed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at 5 (reporting institutional
pressure on the chairman and CEO of British Airways to give up one title; he threatened to quit
instead); John Gapper & Norma Cohen, Barclays to look worldwide for chief executive, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at 1 (reporting that Andrew Buxton, chairman and CEO of Barclays Bank,
gave up the CEO position "after sustained pressure from institutional investors for the roles to be
split").
70
CADBURY COMMITTEE REPORT (1992), supra note 61; see Norma Cohen, Cadbury
proposals prove unpalatable, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at 5.
71

CADBURY COMMITTEE REPORT (1992), supra note 61, ¶¶ 4.9, 4.11, 4.35.
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rules requiring listed firms to disclose annually to shareholders whether
they are in compliance with these and other elements of the Committee's
Code of Best Practice.72
The Cadbury Committee is representative of the British approach to
corporate governance and regulation of financial institutions. U.S.
lawmakers might respond to a crisis by passing a new law or regulation.
The British respond with a blue-ribbon committee that recommends
changes in current practice. These recommendations are usually mild,
by the nature of the committee process. Indeed, the Cadbury
recommendations on nonexecutive directors and audit committees lag
behind common practice in the United States by around a decade. In the
United States, such recommendations would often be ignored. But if a
high-level British committee recommends legal change, some legal
change is likely; if it recommends change in private practice, some
change will predictably occur.
4. PRO NED
The Committee for the Promotion of Non-Executive Directors
(PRO NED) was established in 1982 by "the Bank of England and other
major [financial] institutions"73 to encourage companies to hire more
independent directors and to serve as a clearinghouse for director
candidates. PRO NED's aims, however, are modest. For example, it
recommends mildly that "independent Non-Executive Directors . . .
should comprise about one-third of the Board" for large public
companies.74 More recently, PRO NED joined the Cadbury Committee's
recommendation that public companies should have audit committees
composed exclusively of nonexecutive directors.75
PRO NED's efforts may have contributed to the trend toward
British firms' having a higher proportion of independent directors. Its

72
Id. ¶ 3.7. The sponsors of the Cadbury Committee expect to convene a new committee in
1995 to review the extent of voluntary compliance and to decide whether compliance with some
recommendations should be made mandatory, perhaps by including them in Stock Exchange
listing standards. Id. ¶ 3.12.
73
Brochure of PRO NED (Promotion of Non-Executive Directors), London, England (n.d.,
approx. 1992).
74

PRO NED, Code of Recommended Practice on Non-Executive Directors, reprinted in 27
BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 252 (1987).
75
See Norma Cohen, Auditing role urged for non-executive directors, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1993, at 6.
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candidate list, however, has been little used.76 Interviews with
institutional investors elicited a common explanation. PRO NED
directors were described to us as "good and gray," as "retired types," or
as "not the entrepreneurial people needed on a board." The persons
making these observations believed in the importance of outside
directors, but not in PRO NED's ability to attract the needed personnel.
III. FORMAL AND INFORMAL REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR
A. British Company Law
Corporate law provides a base for institutional exercise of power, by
specifying corporate actions that require shareholder consent. British
company law is generally similar to U.S. corporate law on voting rules
and matters put to shareholder vote.77 Most of the constraints on British
managers are found outside the company law. For example, the
company law allows dual class voting structures, but the institutions
oppose them with sufficient vigor that new issuances of nonvoting stock
are nonexistent.78 Poison pills are also not forbidden by company law,
yet remain rare because of institutional disapproval.
Disclosure requirements were modestly strengthened in response to
the takeover wave of the 1980s. A 1989 amendment to the Companies
Act reduced the threshold for disclosure of major shareholdings to 3%
from 5%.79 But the filing requirement is much less onerous than the
comparable Schedule 13D filing for active 5% shareholders in the
United States. Each shareholder generally files only for itself. Only a
formal agreement triggers an obligation for a shareholder group to

76

See Norma Cohen, Passing the hat round, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at 14 (reporting that
PRO NED receives about 100 requests for names of director candidates each year, but only "a
handful" are selected).
77

See, e.g., Companies Act 1985 §370, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STAT. (1991), supra
note 53, at 443 - 44 (ordinary resolutions require approval by majority of votes cast, with minimal
quorum requirement); Companies Act 1985 § 378, reprinted as amended in 8 Halsbury's Stat.
(1991), supra note 53, at 449 - 50 (extraordinary and special resolutions require approval by 75%
of votes cast).
78
See, e.g., LAURENCE RABINOWITZ, WEINBERG & BLANK ON TAKE-OVERS & MERGERS §
3 - 805 (5th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Weinberg & Blank] ("A number of proposals
by companies to [issue] non-voting ordinary shares have been dropped following institutional
objections, and there are no instances in recent years of a company seeking a listing [on the
London Stock Exchange] for any new class of non-voting equity capital.").
79
Companies Act 1989, ch. 40, § 134(2), PUB. GEN. ACTS 1989, at 2011, 2202 (codified at
8 HALSBURY'S STAT. (1991), supra note 53, at 288) (amending Companies Act 1985 § 199(2)).
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aggregate its holdings;80 there is no analogue to the American concept of
an informal "arrangement" or "understanding" to acquire shares as a
"group."81 Critically, the disclosure does not include a statement of the
filer's plans with respect to the company, and the risk that anyone will
sue claiming incomplete disclosure is remote.
The same political influences that led to the U.S. disclosure rules
are also present in Britain. Corporate managers pressed for more
extensive disclosure and for a freeze on new purchases for a time after a
filing is made; the compromise was a required filing at a lower
ownership level.82 Perhaps the political strength of U.K. financial
institutions shaped this compromise: If institutions are weak, as in the
United States, strong disclosure laws that deter the activity being
disclosed are more likely to be adopted. If institutions are strong, as in
Britain, the resulting disclosure rules do not constrain institutional action
as sharply.
In Britain, as in the United States, fear of insider-trading liability, or
of losing liquidity because one possesses inside information, is a
significant obstacle to close communication between corporate managers
and their major shareholders.83 The ISC explains: "Institutions do not
wish to be made insiders . . . . It is important that such confidences are
not disclosed to investors by companies . . . without the investors' prior
consent."84
B. Securities Industry Regulation
The regulation of financial institutions, long largely informal, took a
major step toward stronger formal regulation with the adoption of the
Financial Services Act 1986, which gave the Treasury Department

80
Companies Act 1985 § 204, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STAT. (1991), supra note 53, at
292- 93.
81

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13d-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (1993).

82

For a British CEO's proposal to strengthen the disclosure rules in this manner, see Sir
Hector Laing, The Balance of Responsibilities, in CREATIVE TENSION? (1990), supra note 11, at
59, 67- 69.
83

Liability for insider trading in the United Kingdom is now governed by Part V of the
recently passed criminal Justice Act 1993. See 30 HALSBURY'S STATUTES: CURRENT STATUTES
SERVICE, Money tit., at 9 (4th ed. 1994) [[[hereinafter HALSBURY'S CURRENT STAT.]. For a
discussion of the new act, see Keith Wotherspoon, Insider Dealing — The New Law: Part V of
Criminal Justice Act 1993, 57 MOD. L. REV. 419 (1994).
84
ISC, RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS (1991), supra note 63, at 2
(emphasis added). In Britain, a shareholder who obtains confidential "price sensitive information"
from an insider may not trade on that information, even if the recipient has not agreed to keep the
information confidential. Criminal Justice Act 1993 §§ 52-53, 56, reprinted in 30 HALSBURY'S
CURRENT STAT. (1994) , supra note 83, Money tit., at 11-13, 15.
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overall responsibility for financial services regulation.85 Still, the City
was largely able to interpose one and sometimes two layers of selfregulatory bodies between itself and the Treasury Department. An
umbrella self- regulator — the Securities Investment Board — oversees
industry-specific self-regulatory bodies, including the London Stock
Exchange, Imro (the Investment Management Regulatory Organization),
Lautro (the Life, Annuity, and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization), and
Fimbra (which governs independent financial advisers).86 The future of
self-regulation, though, is hard to predict. Its political legitimacy was
weakened by the Maxwell scandal, and some major institutions,
including Prudential and National Westminster Bank, have called for
direct government oversight.87
C. Takeover Panel Rules
The American debate over the pros and cons of takeovers, and the
supposedly short-term orientation of large shareholders, was replayed in
Britain, which experienced its own takeover wave in the 1980s.88 The
outcome of the debate, however, was very different. American corporate
managers largely lost the academic debate on the merits of takeovers but
won the war in the legislative trenches. Their already broad power to
resist takeovers was broadened as state legislatures enacted tough
antitakeover statutes and state courts and legislatures endorsed poison
pill defenses.89 In Britain, defensive powers were limited to begin with
and changed little over the decade. There simply are no poison pills,
targeted share placements, or lock- up options by which target managers
can block a tender offer. The restrictive British approach to takeover
defenses may reflect, in part, the political power of British institutions.
It may also reflect managers' lesser power in a legal system where the
managers lack a choice among competing jurisdictions, each eager for
85
Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, reprinted in 30 HALSBURY'S STAT. (1991), supra note
53, at 162.
86

See generally JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THREADNEEDLE STREET 75108 (1993).
87
See Norma Cohen & Peter Martin, Back to the drawing-board: Financial self-regulation
in the UK is facing mounting calls for reform, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1992, at 20.
88
For pieces of the debate, see, for example, CBI TASK FORCE REPORT (1987), supra note
16; CREATIVE TENSION? (1990), supra note 11 (collection of essays by corporate and financial
institution executives); PAUL MARSH, SHORT- TERMISM ON TRIAL (1990) (study commissioned
by the IFMA).
89

See generally Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS
MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321 (Margaret M. Blair ed.,
1993); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
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them to incorporate.
In Britain, the dominant source of rules governing takeovers,
control contests, and acquisitions of large blocks of shares is the City
Code on Take-overs and Mergers and the related Rules Governing
Substantial Acquisitions of Shares, issued and periodically revised by a
nongovernmental body — the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers. The
City Code prohibits essentially all defensive actions when a takeover bid
is pending or when the target has "reason to believe that a bona fide offer
might be imminent."90 The Takeover Panel often issues interpretations
or new rules in midcontest to handle unanticipated situations. The Bank
of England chooses the chair of the Takeover Panel; its members include
representatives of institutional investors, public companies, and the
London Stock Exchange.91 The Takeover Panel has no formal regulatory
power, but its rules are universally obeyed.92
The City Code basically bans defensive tactics during the pendency
of a offer, as well as preclusive pre-bid actions, such as adopting a
poison pill. Once a bid is made, any defensive action requires
shareholder approval — which will be forthcoming only when the
shareholders would have rejected the bid anyway. At the same time,
partial and two-tier bids are forbidden. Anyone who crosses the 30%
ownership level must offer to buy all remaining shares at a uniform
price.93
The effect is that the shareholders decide whether a takeover bid
succeeds or fails. When a firm's major shareholders are happy with
management's performance, they will often collectively turn down a
takeover bid, despite the short-term profit available from selling their
shares.94 When the major shareholders are unhappy with management,

90

PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS & MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS
RULE 21 (1993) (listing prohibited actions); see also id. General Princ. 7 (stating that the target
shall not take any action without shareholder approval "which could effectively result in any bona
fide offer being frustrated").
91

See id. at A2 (listing the Panel's membership).

92

The sanctions for noncompliance with the City Code include delisting by the London Stock
Exchange, the refusal of banks and stockbrokers, who have all agreed to abide by the Code, to
trade the company's shares, and the likely revolt of institutional shareholders at the next general
meeting.
93

See PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS & MERGERS (1993), supra note 90, Rule 9.1. For an overview
of British takeover regulation, see Deborah A. DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover
Regulation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 93-99 (1987).
94
See TRADE & INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS:
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1990-1991 Sess. 278 (1991) [hereinafter TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS]
(testimony of Michael Sandland of Norwich Union); Artus (1990) supra note 11 at 13.
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they will be delighted to sell their shares at a premium to market, and
there is little that the managers can do to stop them.
D. Stock Exchange Rules and Preemption Guidelines
A further source of nongovernmental regulation is the London
Stock Exchange's listing rules and guidelines for listed companies. The
rules are binding on all listed companies. These include obligations to
comply with the City Code, to follow prescribed procedures for proxy
voting at shareholder meetings, and to seek shareholder approval to
disapply preemptive rights (which is needed under company law) only
for the interval between annual shareholder meetings.95
In addition, the London Stock Exchange publishes various
guidelines, of which the most important are the Pre-emption Guidelines .
The Pre-emption Guidelines were developed in the late 1980s by a joint
industry-City-London Stock Exchange group called the Pre-emption
Group and are discussed below.96 The guidelines are only advisory but
have the same practical effect as formal rules for large companies, who
would face a shareholder revolt if they did not follow the guidelines.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:
WHAT DOES AND DOES NOT HAPPEN
The extent of collective action undertaken by British institutional
investors has long remained hidden, in large part because the institutions
usually act quietly and behind the scenes. Limited knowledge is
available from a variety of sources, including (i) prior academic
research, (ii) publicly reported instances in which institutions have
challenged managements, (iii) public statements by financial institution
executives, and (iv) the available data on shareholder voting. Each of
these is a useful but imperfect source of information. For example, the
public statements of officials can be self- serving (and tend to be
maddeningly vague), and the failure of institutional investors to vote on
routine matters is not proof of passivity. Finally, the paucity of incidents
in which institutions publicly unite to oust corporate managers may
demonstrate only the truism that the parties to any dispute tend to

95
WEINBERG & BLANK (1993), supra note 78, at 8001 (reprinting LONDON STOCK
EXCHANGE, ADMISSIONS OF SECURITIES TO LISTING (1991)).
96

See infra section IV.C.2.
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"bargain in the shadow of the law" and seldom proceed to the end game
stage of a public dispute resolved by shareholder vote.
Given these problems, in-depth interviews with institutional
investors seemed a largely missing and important source of evidence.
During the summer of 1992, one of us (Coffee) visited London and
conducted prearranged interviews with senior executives at a
representative sample of leading insurance companies, mutual funds,
pension money managers and self-regulatory organizations. These
interviews focused on the extent to which British institutions engage in
low-visibility forms of collective action and on their willingness to take
high-visibility actions when behind-the-scenes efforts are unavailing.
These interviews inform our discussion in this Part of what British
institutions do and do not do in the corporate governance realm.
We begin with a review of prior research in section IV.A and an
overview of what British institutional investors say in public about their
corporate governance role in section IV.B. We then turn in sections
IV.C to IV.E to what the institutions actually do.
A. Prior Research
The Berle-Means thesis that shareholder dispersion implies weak
oversight over management has long received a skeptical reception
among British academics. Writing in 1961, Professor Florence argued
that Berle and Means had overstated managerial power by focusing only
on the largest two or three shareholders, thereby ignoring the potential
for collective action among a small group of shareholders, none of whom
alone held a decisive stake.97 Florence believed that research should
focus on the twenty largest shareholders, who, he argued, often held
enough shares to effectively control even the largest British
corporations.98 In 1936, the median proportion of voting shares held by
the twenty largest shareholders in the eighty-two largest nonfinancial
British firms was about 40% — compared to 28% for a similar sample of
132 American corporations.99 Moreover, in 40% of the British
companies, the twenty largest shareholders held an absolute majority of
the voting stock, while a similar concentration existed in only 24% of

97
P. SARGANT FLORENCE, THE LOGIC OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY 192 n.2 (rev.
ed. 1961).
98

Id. at 187.

99

Id. at 189.
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American companies surveyed.100
The table below summarizes
Florence's data:
TABLE 3
SHARES IN LARGE U.K. FIRMS
HELD BY TWENTY LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS IN 1936
Percentage Held
0-9.9%
10-19.9%
20-39.9%
30-49.9%
50% and up
TOTALS

Number of Firms
7
11
17
14
33
82

%
9
13
21
17
40
100

In 1986, John Scott, a sociologist, reexamined Florence's hypothesis
that a loose-knit coalition of twenty or so shareholders could potentially
control most large British corporations.101 Scott's data, from a sample of
100 of the 250 largest financial and nonfinancial companies in 1977,
showed that ownership concentration had fallen, as shown in the
following table. The top twenty institutions never held majority control,
but they typically held an influential 20% -29% of the voting stock — a
level of ownership that could carry control of a U.S. public corporation if
held by a single shareholder.102
TABLE 4
BRITISH OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION IN 1977
Percentage of Shares
Held by Top 20%
Shareholders
More than 50%
40-49%
30-39%
20-29%
10-19%
Less than 10%
TOTALS

Number of Enterprises
With Family
Participation
0
1
3
26
6
0
36

Without Family
Participation
0
3
10
35
16
0
64

Total
0
4
13
61
22
0
100

One can gain a fuller sense of the potential for collective
shareholder action in the mid-1970s by examining Scott's list of the
twenty largest shareholders of Imperial Group, one of Britain's largest
industrial companies at the time. We reproduce that list below
100

Id.

101

See JOHN SCOTT, CAPITALIST PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL POWER: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN (1986); see also John Scott, Corporate
control and corporate rule: Britain in an international perspective, 41 BRIT. J. SOC. 351 (1990).
102

SCOTT (1986), supra note 101, at 95.
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alongside, for comparison, a list of the twenty largest institutional
holders of Procter & Gamble in 1990 (P&G is representative of
ownership concentration in the largest American firms).103
TABLE 5
IMPERIAL GROUP—1977
Shareholder
Holding %
Prudential Assurance
2.4
Legal & General Assurance
1.8
Hill Samuel
1.4
National Westminster Bank
1.4
National Coal Board
1.4
M&G Group
1.0
Barclays Bank
0.9
Brittanic Assurance
0.9
Royal Assurance
0.8
Kuwait Investment Office
0.7
Save & Prosper Group
0.7
Cooperative Group
0.6
Commercial Union
0.6
Norwich Union
0.5
Wills family
0.5
Mercury Securities
0.5
Pearl Assurance
0.4
Midland Bank
0.4
General Electric
0.4
Sun Life Assurance Company
0.4
TOTAL
17.7%

PROCTER & GAMBLE—1990
Shareholder
Holding %
PNC Financial
1.7
CalPERS
1.4
Wells Fargo
1.0
Bankers Trust
1.0
Mellon Bank
1.0
Rosenberg Equity Mgmt.
0.9
MNC Financial
0.9
N.Y. State Pension Fund
0.9
Star Bank, Cincinnati
0.7
N.Y. State Teacher’s Pension
0.6
CREF
0.6
State Street Boston Corp.
0.5
Texas Teachers Pension
0.5
Investors Research
0.5
State Street Research
0.4
Sunbank Capital Mgmt.
0.4
Dodge & Cox
0.4
Cal. Teachers Pension
0.4
Miller, Anderson & Sherrerd
0.3
TCW Management
0.3
TOTAL
14.1%

For our purposes, Scott's data has several uses. First, it provides a
benchmark. There has been a sharp increase in concentration in Britain
compared to the level he describes as of the mid-1970s. Today, by one
estimate, the twenty-five largest shareholders own an absolute majority
of the shares of many publicly held British corporations.104 Second,
Scott's data shows that, although much has changed, the players are the
same. Scott found that the same institutions regularly appeared in his
lists. His roster of large shareholders in 1977, ranked by the number of
times they appeared in what he called "controlling constellations" (the
103
Id. at 94. For Procter & Gamble data, see Carolyn K. Brancato, Institutional Investor
Concentration of Economic Power: A Study of Institutional Holdings and Voting Authority in
U.S. Publicly Held Corporations, Part I: Top 25 U.S. Corporations as of December 31, 1990 app.
2 (Sept. 12, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, Columbia Institutional Investor Project, Columbia
Univ. School of Law Ctr. for Law & Economic Studies) (this data is for shares held with sole
voting power; the total holdings by P&G's top 20 shareholders were 18.8%).
104

See Jackson (1991), supra note 10.
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top twenty shareholders of each company) reads like a roster of Britain's
largest institutional investors today:105
TABLE 6
LARGEST BRITISH INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS—1977
Institutional Investor
Prudential Assurance
National Coal Board
Cooperative Group
Legal & General Assurance
Norwich Union Insurance
Pearl Assurance
Barclays Bank
Hill Samuel
Robert Fleming
Electricity Council
Mercury Securities
Royal Insurance
“Shell” Transport and Trading Pension
National Westminster Bank
Commercial Union Assurance
Britannic Assurance
Midland Bank
Church Commissioners
General Accident
Save & Prosper Group

Number of Appearances Among Top 20
Shareholds (for 100 firms)
88
75
64
64
64
60
55
52
52
48
48
46
45
44
42
39
39
38
38
37

Although we lack data for the 1950s and 1960s, when institutions were
replacing individuals as the largest shareholders, the Florence and Scott
studies suggest that ownership and control were never as separated in the
United Kingdom as in the United States. British corporate managers thus
may have never had the same sustained opportunity to become entrenched.
Concentration levels dipped temporarily as institutions replaced individual
shareholders, but this was only a modest deviation from a long-run pattern of
concentrated ownership.
The similarity of British concentration in 1977 to U.S. concentration
today suggests that the British experience may foreshadow the future course
of institutional activism in U.S. corporate governance. There remain,
however, important differences. In the United States, both legal constraints
and the smaller size of U.S. institutions relative to the U.S. equity market
make it likely that we will see only a gradual increase in the stakes held by
105

SCOTT (1986), supra note 101, at 100.
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the largest shareholders, rather than a quick shift to current levels of British
ownership concentration.106
B. Money Manager Statements
A second source of background information about British
institutions is the public statements of British money managers. The
general themes that emerge from these statements — themes that are
broadly consistent with our interview evidence — are frequent dialogue,
occasional informal intervention when a firm is in trouble, but only
infrequent formal intervention. Both commentators and fund managers
agree that institutions should operate behind the scenes whenever
possible. The Institutional Shareholders' Committee explains: "The most
effective action is taken quickly, and without publicity."107
As to how active the institutions are, R.E. Artus, chief investment
manager of Prudential Corporation, one of the more active institutional
investors, recently wrote:
In any given week our senior investment managers and specialist
support staff will have contact with a dozen or more companies and
their professional advisers, concerned with the relationship between
companies and their shareholders, and quite distinct from the
programme of meetings with our [security] analysts . . . .
....
. . . [I]ntervention by shareholders does in fact occur from time to time,
and we have been concerned with some well known instances as well as
many more less publicised cases. But the extent of such activity by
shareholders in Britain does not remotely approach the level where it is an
effective substitute for the involvement of the banks in Germany or the
Keiretsu system in Japan.108

Many British commentators wish that institutions would be more
engaged, but few have prescriptions for how to bring this about. The
British worry about whether the stock market encourages a short-term
orientation on the part of corporate managers, and they envy the
willingness (so they believe) of Japanese and German banks to intervene
106
We consider these and other likely continuing differences between the United States and
Britain in Part VI.
107
ISC, RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS (1991), supra note 63, at 3;
see also TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (1991), supra note 94, at 278 (testimony of Michael Sandland
of Norwich Union).
108
Artus (1990), supra note 11, at 12, 14. Professor James Ball, Chairman of Legal &
General Group PLC, states, "We are certainly not passive . . . . [W]e like to meet directly with
the managers of a company, generally in a one to one meeting, and we like to focus on the strategy
of the business." James Ball, Financial Institutions and their role as shareholders, in CREATIVE
TENSION? (1990), supra note 11, at 18, 25; see also M&G 1992 ANNUAL REPORT , supra note
46, at 3 (containing the mission statement of M&G, quoted in section II.A.3).
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when a firm gets in trouble. A representative statement from Jonathan
Charkham, until recently the Bank of England's senior adviser on
corporate governance matters:
Unlike Germany and Japan, UK company management lacks both
regular sources of sympathetic influence and, in the rare cases where it
is essential, the stimulation of remedial action . . . . The Companies
Acts give shareholders the necessary powers to [exercise] influence,
but for various reasons they seldom do so.109

Yet, to American eyes, this breast beating seems overdone. British
institutions turn over their portfolios much more slowly than their
American counterparts. Many of the largest British institutions profess a
long-term view, including willingness to turn down a takeover premium,
and to try to change management rather than sell their shares. Over half
of all hostile bids fail, compared to only about twenty percent in the
United States in the days before poison pills. Often, the institutions band
together to support the target's management, and are willing to accept "a
short-term fall in the biddee's share price below the bid value."110
C. The Extent of Informal Shareholder Action
The general statements quoted in section IV.B give only limited
insight into how often the institutions intervene in corporate affairs, and
what institutional investors actually do. Scott, for example, doubted that
his "constellations" of top twenty shareholders could easily act "as a
cohesive group."111 Rather, he concluded that their power lay, first, in
their ability to cause the failure of "any attempt to raise new capital
through a rights issue," and, second, in their power to veto a proposed
restructuring if the corporation encountered financial trouble.112 This
description still captures much of the influence that institutional
investors have over corporate managers.
1. Protecting Shareholder Rights
One common goal of a shareholder coalition is to protect or restore
shareholder rights for later use. A paradigmatic example is a dispute that
arose in the mid-1970s between institutional investors and Lloyds Bank
over a provision in Lloyds's Articles of Association that capped voting
109
JONATHAN CHARKHAM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE MARKET FOR COMPANIES:
ASPECTS OF THE SHAREHOLDERS' ROLE 7 (Bank of Eng. Discussion Paper No. 44, 1989).
110
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rights at 500 votes per shareholder.113 This provision limited Lloyds's
twenty largest shareholders, who collectively held 16% of its stock, to
voting power of only 0.01% each. In 1978, institutional pressure forced
Lloyds to drop this provision and return to the normal one-share, onevote allocation of voting power.114 Although twenty-odd shareholders,
each holding only 0.01% of the voting power, obviously could not
compel such a change, large shareholders were able to credibly
threatennot to participate in Lloyds's subscription offerings. Similar
market-based pressure appears to have worked in a number of other
cases.115
The Lloyds case illustrates both the potential for and the limitations
on collective action by institutional investors. First, the stakes were
high. Not only were basic voting rights at issue, but the issue was not
limited to one firm. If Lloyds could limit institutions to a maximum
number of votes, other companies would predictably follow suit. In such
cases, British institutions have recurrently fought. Institutional investors
have regularly objected to attempts to issue nonvoting or limited voting
shares. As a result, according to a leading treatise, "there are no
instances in recent years of a company seeking a listing for any new
class of non-voting equity capital."116
Not only were the stakes high in the Lloyds case, but the cost of
opposition was low. The beauty of a shareholder refusal to subscribe
to a preemptive rights offering as a strategy is that it costs little and
forces the issuer to come to the shareholders to negotiate, not the
reverse. Information costs were also low. Because issues surrounding
voting are easy to understand and are not company specific,
shareholder coordination costs are lower than for disputes over
business strategy or the competence of specific managers. These costs
are further reduced by two other factors: (i) there can be economies
of scale associated with organizing with regard to recurring issues;
and (ii) if shareholder opposition can be coordinated through an
industry association such as the NAPF or the ABI, the free-rider
problem is reduced because the association's costs will be spread
among all of its members. The minimum twenty-one-day period that
113

See id. at 99.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 127 n.39 (citing a case involving Peninsular & Oriental); Ian H. Fazey, Trinity Intl
turns in £9.44m and enfranchises shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at 28; Paul L. Davies
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a preemptive rights offering must remain open provides ample time for
a number of large shareholders to coordinate their actions.117
One sees preservation of shareholder rights also in what did not
happen to takeover rules in response to the 1980s takeover wave.
British takeover defenses were much more limited than American
defenses when the decade began; the gap increased as American
courts and legislatures blessed poison pills and other potent defenses.
British firms pushed for stricter regulation, but the institutions were
able to preserve the market for corporate control as a constraint on
managerial discretion.
2. Protecting the Preemptive Rights Weapon
Refusal to subscribe to a preemptive rights offering has a serious
theoretical weakness as a source of shareholder leverage over
managers. British company law allows a company to seek shareholder
approval to "disapply" preemptive rights for up to five years at a
time.118 Company law also lets companies issue rights to buy new
shares at a very large discount to the pre-offer market value of their
shares.
A large discount forces current shareholders either to
subscribe, sell their rights to someone else who will subscribe, or face
severe dilution.
Conversely, the smaller the discount, the more
feasible the strategy of refusing either to subscribe or to sell one's
rights, expecting other shareholders to act the same way. Moreover, if
the discount is only a few percent, refusal to subscribe by a firm's
largest shareholders can send a negative signal to other potential
investors, cause the share price to drop below the subscription price,
and thereby cause the rights offering to fail.
Institutional investors have been zealous in defending preemptive
rights and the leverage they provide. In the mid-1980s, companies
began to seek broad authority from shareholders to disapply
preemptive rights for up to the maximum five-year period permitted
by company law, and also sought to circumvent preemptive rights by
issuing convertible debt on terms that made conversion in the near
future virtually certain. Institutional shareholders revolted. The ABI
and NAPF advised their members to reject disapplication requests
except in very narrow circumstances.119
117
See Companies Act 1985 § 90(6), reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STAT. (1991), supra note
53, at 201.
118
See Companies Act 1985 §§ 80(4), 80(5), 95, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STAT. (1991),
supra note 53, at 193, 204.
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In response, the London Stock Exchange limited the
disapplication period to the one-year interval between shareholders'
meetings. In addition, a joint industry-City-London Stock Exchange
working group was formed, called the Pre-emption Group, which
issued, and has since periodically revised, its Pre-emption Guidelines.
The guidelines generally limit nonpreemptive issuances to 5% or less
of a company's share capital in any one year and 7.5% or less over a
rolling three-year period.120 As a practical matter, the guidelines are
binding on all public companies. Major shareholders will not vote for
a disapplication proposal that exceeds the guidelines, and the major
investment banks will not underwrite such an offering. The Preemption Guidelines do not limit the discount that a listed company
can offer in a rights offering. However, companies know that if they
attempt a coercive, deep discount offer, they are likely to face a
shareholder revolt at the next annual meeting, and investment bankers
know that a coercive rights offering will alienate their best customers.
Thus, deep discount offers are rare.121
3. CEO Replacement
At the opposite end of a continuum from general to companyspecific issues is replacement of a poorly performing CEO. Here, the
institutions' performance is mixed. As we discuss in more detail
below, in a number of recent cases, institutional pressure has
prompted a change in CEO. Even before these recent episodes, there
was a long history of instances in which a board replaced a CEO in
order to secure a successful subscription offering. But the road to
CEO replacement is long and bumpy, and many institutional efforts
get sidetracked in various ways. The limits on institutional prodding
are especially evident when companies do not need new equity capital
and therefore are less vulnerable to institutional refusal to subscribe to
a rights offering.
4. Board Structure and Membership
Twenty-five years ago, British and American boards looked much
alike. They were numerically dominated by inside directors. The
CEO also served as board chairman, selected new directors, and
thoroughly dominated the boardroom. Since then, both countries have
115; Who's Running the Show? Why UK Institutions Are Blocking Equity Issues, BUS. INTL.
MONEY REP., May 11, 1987, at 146.
120
121

LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, PRE-EMPTION GUIDELINES §§ 1.2, 2.1 (1987).

Conversation with Jonathan Charkham, former adviser on corporate governance, Bank
of England, in New York, N.Y. (May 5, 1994).
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moved toward greater board independence, though in different ways.
In the United States, almost all large company boards now have a
majority of outside directors, and an increasing number have a majority
of independent directors — directors without business or family ties
to the firm.122 The CEO, however, still usually chairs the board.
In Britain, a large percentage of British firms, under institutional
prodding, have separated the jobs of CEO and chairman of the board,
and many have assigned the role of chairman to an outside director.
On the other hand, Britain has moved more slowly toward
independent boards and separate audit committees.123 In Britain, as in
the United States, institutional investors rarely sit on corporate boards
themselves.
It is not clear how much to make of these differences. Perhaps
British institutions are strong enough that they feel less need for
majority- independent boards, as long as there are some independent
directors who can be contacted in case of need. Moreover, the two
countries are converging, as more U.S. firms appoint separate board
chairmen and British institutions become "increasingly prepared . . .
where necessary to encourage Boards to appoint an adequate number
of independent non-executive directors."124 Still, the prevalence of
insider-dominated boards suggests that institutional concern with
board structure was less than vigorous in the past.
5. Voting Behavior
In the United States, most institutions, even if they routinely
support management, at least vote their shares.
In the United
Kingdom, most institutions historically have not voted. For example,
fewer than 20% of pension funds surveyed by the NAPF in 1991
regularly voted.125
It is unclear how important the lack of formal voting is.
Institutions do vote in proxy fights. For example, a recent proxy
fight at Wart produced a 96% turnout; strong institutional support
enabled the incumbents to defeat a dissident shareholder despite the
dissident's 29% holding.126 Informal access to corporate executives
and nonexecutive directors may largely obviate the need for
122
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American-style shareholder proposals. Some fund managers even
argue that they should not vote on routine matters, as this will only
lull management into believing that the institutions support them.127
Most of those we interviewed, however, took the opposite position —
that fund managers who vote regularly created a greater impression
when they withheld their votes. One said that by voting routinely
and then withholding as a specific protest, he ensured that
management would call and request his proxy, thereby creating an
opportunity to explain his dissatisfaction.
In general, fund managers agree that shares should be voted but
point to logistical problems.
A fund manager may serve as a
fiduciary for several dozen (and sometimes a hundred or more)
clients holding a particular stock. Some may have granted proxy
authority to the fund manager; others may not have. Moreover, the
typical agreement between a fund manager and its pension clients
giving the manager the power to vote the clients' shares requires the
fund manager to first consult the client on "contentious" matters. A
vote against management is arguably "contentious"; moreover, many
fund managers believe that it is good client relations to consult with
their clients before opposing management.
Yet consulting dozens of clients is a time-consuming chore.
Several fund managers reported to us that the intense competition
among fund managers for pension business means that they cannot
easily pass on the costs of voting to the client. These costs include
not only the de minimis direct costs of voting but also the cost of
research on voting issues and the indirect costs of client consultation.
In any event, a major transition seems to be in progress in fund
managers' attitudes towards voting. In 1991, the IFMA recommended
that its members should always vote their shares.128 Two of the
largest fund managers in Britain — Robert Fleming and Phillips &
Drew — have adopted policies either to always vote or to vote
whenever they hold over 1% of the issuer's shares.129 M&G Group,
the largest unit-trust manager, has decided to vote whenever it owns
more than 2.5% of the company.130
Prudential, Britain's largest
institutional investor, informed us, "We vote every share." Thus,
127
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institutional voting is likely in the near future to become the rule,
rather than the exception.
This shift could reflect the confluence of several factors: First,
as institutional stakes become larger and subject to a greater liquidity
discount on sale, logic dictates that institutional shareholders should
rely more on "voice" and less on "exit." Second, voluntary rules,
such as the IFMA proposal, may be seen as an alternative to state
intervention. Third, American influence may also have an impact.
British institutions have observed the American voting practices and
also realize that if they do not vote, the votes of American
institutions, who own a significant fraction of British equities, could
dictate the outcome of shareholder votes.
6. Management and Director Compensation
British institutional investors have begun to address the difficult
task of establishing optimal manager and director compensation. For
example, the NAPF has urged companies to award management stock
options that pay off only if the company outperforms a broad index
of all British equities,131 and the ISC opposes stock-option awards and
retirement plans for directors.132 But British executive compensation
is, on the whole, even less sensitive to firm performance than
American compensation.
Very few public U.K. companies have
adopted incentive compensation arrangements, and only seven of the
FTSE-100 fully meet the Cadbury Committee's recommendations on
remuneration.133
The complex incentives created by different pay schemes make it
hard to tell whether these proposals are sound; indeed, the ABI does
not endorse the NAPF proposal. Still, the outlandish compensation
of CEOs at many American (and some British) firms134 suggests that
this is an appropriate area for shareholder oversight. One wonders
whether the relative restraint shown by British CEOs is self-restraint

131

See Norma Cohen, Stock option schemes queried, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at 10.
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ISC, ROLE AND DUTIES OF DIRECTORS (1991), supra note 63, at 3.
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See Directors' pay, FIN. TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 12. The Cadbury Committee
recommended: (i) that shareholders receive "a full and clear statement of directors' present and
future benefits"; (ii) that future service contracts should run no longer than three years; (iii) that
boards should have remuneration committees consisting "wholly or mainly of non-executive
directors and chaired by a non-executive director"; and (iv) that executive directors should "play
no part in decisions on their own remuneration." CADBURY COMMITTEE REPORT (1992), supra
note 61,¶¶ 4.40-4.42.
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7. Diversification: The Objections Not Made
A major motive for U.S. takeovers in the 1980s was reversing
prior diversification efforts, most of which had turned out badly.135
Active shareholders could potentially discourage diversification, which
may benefit undiversified or empire-building managers at the expense
of already diversified shareholders.136 Yet many large British firms
diversified over the same period as their American counterparts, with
similarly poor results, based on anecdotal evidence.
Large
shareholders largely sat on the sidelines and watched the
diversification trend unfold.
The lack of organized shareholder opposition to diversification
efforts is understandable. Neither of the two principal justifications
for intervention applies to these cases. First, there was no principle
of shareholder rights at stake; and second, there was no acute
financial crisis. Absent these conditions, British institutions are
generally unwilling to intervene.
Imprudent diversification may
become one item in a list of particulars that the institutions would
raise in pushing for managerial change, but this relatively weak
constraint did not stop the diversification trend. Whatever the cause,
shareholder failure to object more strongly to diversification efforts
suggests limits on the potency of British-style oversight. The survival
of conglomeration as a respectable strategy also suggests that
shareholder oversight cannot fully substitute for the market for
corporate control, in which a financial entrepreneur can profit by
breaking a conglomerate into several parts and selling the pieces.
D. Proxy Fights: The Exceptional Case
Given the concentrated institutional ownership of British equities,
it is reasonable to presume that institutions in Britain should be able to
exercise voting control, at least when the case for intervention seems
clear. Nonetheless, instances in which institutions have publicly taken
coordinated action to oust managers are conspicuous by their rarity.
The paucity of visible examples may reflect British preference
for quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiation. Just as most lawsuits settle
135
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without trial, most corporate governance disputes may be resolved
privately as the parties "bargain in the shadow of the law." Yet, the
process of backstage negotiation should sometimes break down and
leave discernible evidence of the formation of investor coalitions.
The folklore of the City provides only a few well-known stories of
such interventions through the early 1980s, notably the campaigns to
change management at Rank and Woolworths.
Nonetheless, on at least three occasions between 1991 and 1993,
a coalition of institutional investors publicly undertook to remove a
board of directors, and threats of similar interventions have prompted
management changes in other recent cases. These recent interventions
may suggest an increase in the willingness of institutional investors to
take collective action, which in turn could reflect the growing
concentration of share ownership.
The first of these battles was the 1991 effort by a coalition of
institutions led by Norwich Union, one of Britain's largest insurance
companies, to replace the board of Tace PLC.137
This contest
received widespread press attention, both because it was the first
instance in recent memory in which negotiations broke down so
thoroughly that the entire board was removed and because the
institutional group was led by the chairman of the Institutional
Shareholders' Committee. Press accounts branded Tace management
as "profligate, inefficient and arrogant," and portrayed the contest as
demonstrating the power of institutional shareholders.138 Still, a closer
analysis suggests that this was a battle that both sides stumbled into
and from which the institutions emerged scarred and eager to avoid
further public fights.
The circumstances surrounding the Tace fight were unusual in
several respects. First, the company's founder and chief executive held
a 23% block and apparently believed — incorrectly — that he could
win a vote at a special shareholders' meeting. Second, the dispute
centered less around poor financial results than around the very high
compensation paid to Tace's founder. The battle was precipitated in
1990 when the outside director who had been the institutions' ally
resigned, apparently after a falling out with the founder. The customary
137
For pieces of the Tace story, see Norma Cohen, Getting directors on board, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1992, at 12; Richard Gourlay, 4.4% holding in Tace changes hands, FIN. TIMES, June 24,
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round of nonpublic meetings between large shareholders and Tace
management failed, over the next year, to produce any results.
Apparently, at some point a shareholder complained to the Bank of
England about the remuneration paid by Tace to its founder.
Sidestepping direct involvement, the Bank of England advised the
shareholder to contact Norwich Union, which held 5% of Tace's shares.
Here, the plot thickens.
Negotiations began between the
institutions and the Tace board over the selection of a new chief
executive officer. Then, without consulting the institutions, the
Tace board chose a successor that the institutions found
unacceptable, apparently because of his close associations with
the founder. Insulted and also conscious of the surrogate role
that Norwich Union had been delegated by the Bank of England,
E.M. Sandland, Norwich Union's chief investment officer and the
chairman of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee, quickly
lined up two other institutional shareholders — Framlington and
GT Management — to share the cost of a campaign to oust the
Tace board. Framlington, which held 16% of Tace, stayed with
the coalition over a several-month battle, but GT Management
soon dropped out. Other institutions were kept in the coalition,
according to Sandland, only through "active handholding" by
Norwich Union.
Tace's management did not remain passive; it used its own
investment bankers to contact shareholders and assembled a
friendly 29% block of the stock.
Then, in midcontest, an
unaffiliated bidder announced an unsolicited tender offer, which
touched off a bidding contest.
This gave management a new
argument: that the proxy fight should be shelved until the
takeover battle was resolved. Despite these obstacles, Norwich
Union assembled proxies from 40% of Tace's shareholders, called
an emergency general meeting of the shareholders, and voted the
board out of office at an acrimonious meeting.
The implications of the Tace battle can be read in various
ways. Although the media lionized Sandland and Norwich Union
as reformers, Sandland's actions were questioned by his own
board and by many of his fellow fund managers. Although
Sandland was defended by all insurance company officials that we
interviewed, several fund managers either criticized him for
"headline hunting" or disavowed his "un-British approach" that
would embarrass the City.
Victory was also bittersweet for
Norwich Union, because it and Framlington were forced to split a
£60,000 bill for solicitors' services. Other institutions declined to
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share these costs. The Tace battle thus shows both the pushcomes-to-shove power of institutional investors and the enduring
significance of the free rider problem.
The significance of the Tace episode is further clouded by
the fact that Tace was a relatively small company, with sales of
only £36 million, and that Norwich Union was encouraged by the
Bank of England. Further, given the difficulties that Norwich
Union had in holding together a relatively small coalition, it is
uncertain whether any single institution would be able to
assemble and maintain the much larger coalition needed to
challenge management at a major firm, such as General Electric
Company, whose financial performance has been lackluster but
whose sales total £9.5 billion. 139 Free rider problems might be
ameliorated if an umbrella organization helped to form the
coalition, but the Institutional Shareholders' Committee has
withdrawn from playing such a role. 140
In a second public campaign begun by institutional investors
in 1991, the chief executive of Brown & Jackson, a large British
discount retailing chain, was ousted, and virtually all the firm's
senior management were replaced. 141 The apparent cause of the
shareholder revolt at Brown & Jackson was a combination of poor
operating results and a disastrous 1988 acquisition of an unrelated
business from a selling group that included the ousted chairman.
Institutional distaste for self-dealing may have been evident here,
as in Tace. Initially, the institutions demanded that the entire
board resign, but after Brown & Jackson switched to an
investment banking firm that had the institutions' confidence, they
agreed to a less drastic transition, in which the old board, and a
new CEO picked by the outgoing CEO, would remain, but the
new CEO would leave if the new financial advisor concluded that
he should do so.
Perhaps because Brown & Jackson did not carry the fight to
the bitter end, there was less fallout, and surely less cost, from the
Brown & Jackson campaign than from the Tace campaign. But it
is still potentially significant that the lead institution in Brown &
139

See Clare Dobie, Why laggard GEC needs new boss, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 2, 1991,

at 19.
140
141

See supra section II.B.2.

For pieces of the Brown & Jackson story, see Neil Bennett, Brown & Jackson to seek
rescue approval, THE TIMES (London), June 15, 1992, § 2 (Business), at 20; Alistair Blair, A
coalition versus a dictator, FIN. TIMES, May 27, 1992, at 13; Norma Cohen, New adviser at
Brown & Jackson, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at 24; Norma Cohen, Tough tactics behind the unit
trusts, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1992, at 15. The description of the Brown & Jackson campaign in text
is based on these sources and on our interviews.
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Jackson was Fidelity Investments Ltd., a subsidiary of Fidelity
Group, the largest U.S. mutual fund group.
Perhaps Fidelity,
because it was foreign-owned and thus less subject to local
conflicts of interest, felt less constrained in mounting a public
campaign. Moreover, the Brown & Jackson campaign had a
personal cost for Fidelity's chief corporate governance man, Alistair
Blair, who was sacked not long thereafter — reportedly because "it
was felt by [Fidelity's] marketing men . . . that such activity drew
too much attention to Fidelity's investment failures." 142
Fidelity has, moreover, had losses as well as victories. In
1992, it vigorously opposed a debt restructuring at WPP Group
PLC, the giant British advertising firm, arguing that the
restructuring favored debtholders over shareholders. But Fidelity,
which held 10% of WPP's preferred stock, was unable to muster
enough support from other institutions to obtain the 25%-no vote
needed to block the restructuring. With defeat imminent, Fidelity
abandoned its opposition in return for the modest concession that
the preferred shares would be represented on the new WPP
board. 143
The most recent widely publicized fight was the 1993
campaign led by Prudential to install new management at Spring
Ram. 144 Spring Ram's founder and CEO Bill Rooney, who owned
16% of its stock, had shown bad business judgment in pursuing
new ventures in a recessionary climate.
With earnings under
pressure, he pushed Spring Ram's operating divisions and
accountants to report good news, which led the accountants to
resign and one division to falsify the numbers it reported to top
management.
When these problems surfaced, Prudential and
other institutions informally urged Spring Ram to find a new
CEO, but were rebuffed by Rooney and his handpicked board.
Spring Ram did appoint a new finance director with strong ties to
Prudential, presumably at the Pru's urgings, but after a further
bad earnings report, Prudential (which held 12% of Spring Ram),
Lazard Freres (which held 6%), Standard Life, and Barings
decided that Rooney had to go.
142
Tim Blackstone, Fidelity Goes Mad on Media, EVENING STANDARD, May 1, 1992, at 35,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Estand File; see also Blair (1992), supra note 141 (remarking,
in an article offering advice to other activist investment officers: "Beware your own chief
executive. Does it look wise, from where he sits, to put your firm in the spotlight?").
143
For overviews of this dispute, see Melcher & Oster (1993), supra note 41; Pierre Tran,
Advertising Group WPP's Debt Plan Brings New Lease on Life, REUTER LIBR. REP., Aug. 5,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
144
For pieces of the Spring Ram story, see Andrew Bolger, Hostages to declining housing
market fortunes, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at 20; Andrew Bolger, Rooney's future remains
unclear, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at 22; Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12.
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Rooney continued to resist, but Prudential was able to
amass the support of about a dozen institutions, collectively
holding 35% of Spring Ram's stock — enough to replace the
board if a proxy fight was required. 145 In the end, the board
conceded. A new executive chairman chosen by Prudential was
installed, together with a majority of new directors. As a facesaving gesture, Rooney remained as chief executive for several
more months, but the new chairman had the board votes to sack him
and did so several months later.
The publicized institutional campaigns at Tace, Brown &
Jackson, and Spring Ram demonstrate that institutions, when
they unite, can oust managements — but at a cost. When the
parties bargain in the shadow of formal voting power, as they
typically do, it is surely important that corporate managers know
they will probably lose in pitched battle. Still, each episode
involved a relatively small company; two cases — Tace and
Spring Ram — raised issues of management integrity, to which
British institutions seem particularly sensitive; and in one case
— Brown & Jackson — the money manager leading the charge
soon lost his job because the publicity displeased his boss.
E. The Process of Coalition Formation
For the researcher, the strong preference of British
institutions for behind- the-scenes action raises questions about
the frequency of this activity, how long the process takes, the
costs and obstacles involved, and the issues around which
institutional coalitions are built. The longer, more costly, and
less effective the process of backstage negotiations, the more
likely it is that the institutions will sell into the market, rather
than organize to oppose management.
Conversely, as
institutional holdings grow, coordination costs decline, while the
exit option becomes more costly because of the discount that an
institution must absorb to sell its position.
The process of coalition formation and negotiation can be
lengthy when the object is to oust a particular firm's managers.
For example, the institutional efforts that forced changes in
chief executives at Brown & Jackson and at Great Western
Resources during 1992 (both of which were successful) "took a
145
Prudential, Lazard Freres, Standard Life, and Barings were the only institutions named
in press accounts and appear to have formed the core of the institutional opposition to Spring Ram
management. The additional supporting institutions, recruited by Prudential when the coalition's
initial efforts were rebuffed, played a smaller role in the campaign. We do not know how many
of these institutions agreed to share the costs of a proxy fight and how many only agreed to vote
with Prudential if a proxy fight took place.
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year or more to unfold, during which time the share prices
declined steadily." 146 The Tace affair also continued for nearly
a year after institutional objections were first made; the Spring
Ram ouster took upwards of six months.
The time element
raises the cost of building and maintaining a coalition.
Moreover, once an institution joins a coalition, it will be
expected to stand fast and not liquidate its stake in the
company. Having assumed a leadership role, one loses face —
within a cohesive community in which reputations are important
— if one abandons the collective effort by selling one's stake.
The process of coalition formation inevitably begins with
one or more fund managers deciding that a company is seriously
underperforming — in a way that can be changed by shareholder
intervention. Because the largest British institutions hold very
diversified portfolios — Prudential, for example, estimates
holding 900 U.K. stocks at any one time — recognition of a
problem may itself be delayed. The trigger may be a public
crisis or a falling stock price that is evident to all.
Some
institutional investors, however, do attempt a more elaborate
monitoring relationship with their portfolio companies. Some
insurance companies schedule regular review and consulting
sessions with their portfolio companies.
Our interviewees
regularly cited Prudential as distinctive in its commitment to
monitoring. Some referred to it as the "industrial statesman" of
their community; the press has dubbed it the unofficial "High
Sheriff of the City." 147 Prudential informed us that it generally
meets with its portfolio companies twice a year — annually for
smaller companies — for a detailed review.
Prudential's approach is not unique.
Legal & General
Group, another large insurer, estimates that it holds 500
meetings a year with corporate managements. 148 M&G, the unit
trust firm, follows a similar policy. At these meetings, each
institution regularly raises corporate governance issues,
particularly issues involving board structure.
Each notes its
dissatisfaction if a company has too few nonexecutive directors.
In contrast, most fund managers are reluctant to intervene with
regard to specific business decisions. Some have said publicly
that they do not believe in "bullying the board," and most
stressed in private their own limited competence. "We are stock
traders, not business consultants" was a recurrent refrain. In
146

See Blair (1992), supra note 141, at 13.
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See Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12, at 5.
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See Dobie (1991), supra note 60, at 23.
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their words, the City intervened "only when the company
seemed to have lost its way."
Asked to described how the process of intervention begins,
the interviewees agreed that dissatisfied fund managers expect
the largest shareholders to take the lead.
The first step is
usually a phone call or two from a large shareholder to the CEO
or a nonexecutive director — or perhaps from an unhappy
smaller shareholder to a larger shareholder, to see if the larger
shareholder is willing to take action.
Depending on the
response to the initial contact, and on the seriousness of the
situation, some fraction of these calls will be followed by
further telephone calls, or by requests for face-to-face meetings.
Other institutions expect an institution that was "overweighted"
in the stock to take the lead in organizing joint shareholder
action. Overweighting means that the institution owns a greater share
of the specific company than it owns of the market generally. An
overweighted firm has a greater incentive to intervene, because it will
gain more from success than its competitors.
In contrast, an
underweighted firm is likely to remain passive, because any share
price gains would help it less than its competitors, while it bore a
disproportionate share of the costs.
Typically, if the matter progresses beyond a telephone call or
two, the overweighted shareholder will arrange an informal meeting
with management, which other institutions will probably not attend.
Most interviewees agreed that this meeting would produce
considerable information and a host of defensive responses, but little
promise of change. Several pointed to the informational advantage
that management has — "they can always give you detailed reasons
why their case is exceptional" — and suggested that portfolio
managers who debate business strategy with company executives risk
"getting out of our depth." Portfolio managers are trained to be
"good listeners," one remarked, not debaters. As a result, they said,
portfolio managers typically rely either on a nonexecutive director or
on the company's investment bankers for a more expert evaluation of
the evidence than the portfolio managers are capable of themselves.
Some interviewees stressed that they examined the board to see who
among its nonexecutive directors they could talk to in confidence.
Direct communication between institutional investors and outside
directors seems firmly established in Britain, in contrast to the United
States.
If the institution is dissatisfied with the response it receives, it
can solicit support from other institutions. However, before taking
this step, one leading fund manager suggested, the institution might
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ask management to arrange a meeting for it with the nonexecutive
directors and the firm's financial adviser. "Don't underestimate the
power of a 3% shareholder; if you have 3%, you have clout," we
were told. Even such a request — or its suggestion — may cause
management to become more responsive.
Others, however, opined that before an institution requests a
meeting with the independent directors, it needs to show that it is not
an isolated dissident — that "it speaks for the shareholders." Some
have publicly estimated that an institution needs to line up 10% -15%
of the company's stock before requesting a formal meeting — or
before the board will pay serious attention.149
In most of the
incidents recounted to us, the instigator of the coalition had assembled
an even larger percentage of the shares before asking for a meeting
with the board. One prominent fund manager described to us an
instance in which it lined up four other institutions, who with it
collectively held 30% of the corporation's voting stock, and was able
without publicity to secure the resignation of the firm's CEO.
One prerequisite to forming a coalition to replace the CEO was
commonly noted by our interviewees. It is often not enough, they
said, to decide that "the CEO must be sacked"; rather, the institutions
need to find a "savior" — someone who can turn the company
around.150 If not, it may make more sense for the institution to sell,
or to try to convince the board to search for a successor. Often, this
issue can be discussed in confidence with the corporation's financial
advisor. In a few instances, institutional investors have even formed
a coalition with the firm's financial advisor to seek to replace the
incumbent chief executive.151 In other instances, the institutions will
propose that the company retain a different financial advisor, who will
prepare a recapitalization plan.
Most of the time, the institutions will never form a coalition.
One or more unhappy institutions will communicate their concerns to
management or to trusted nonexecutive directors; and press stories
may appear stating that "institutional shareholders" are seeking such
and such a change. The board will get the message, and either some
149

See Blair (1992), supra note 141, at 13.
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In the Tace battle, for example, Norwich Union was seeking to restore Michael Beckett,
a former CEO of Tace, to office. See Gourlay, Institutions launch bid (1991), supra note 137,
at 10. Similarly, at Spring Ram, Prudential knew whom it wanted as the new CEO — an
executive who had turned around another company in which Prudential had invested — before it
provoked a showdown with the board. See Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12.
151
An example is the 1991 revolt of institutional investors at Granada Group. SG Warburg,
financial adviser to the firm, apparently joined institutional investors in deciding that the CEO
should be replaced, in part as the price for completing a rights issue that the investors had resisted.
See Raymond Snoddy, Sacrifice to woo the franchise gods, FIN. TIMES, May 11, 1991, at 10.
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change will take place or financial results will improve, diminishing
the urgency of change. Sometimes the institutions will get what they
want, but often the outcome will be a compromise. For example, a
firm, instead of ousting the CEO, may appoint a new nonexecutive
chairman, finance director, or financial adviser, or promise to elect
more nonexecutive directors and to consult the institutions when
choosing these new directors.
The institutions' willingness to
compromise reflects a number of factors, including their own
uncertainty about the best course of action, the cost and difficulty of
building a coalition to press for more than the company is offering,
and their strong reluctance to take public action.
The most important question about the behind-the-scenes activism
of institutions is, of course, the frequency of such activity. Little data
exists on this question. The tip of the pyramid is a CEO sacking.
Piecing together various sources, there seem to have been at least ten
companies, in addition to Tace, Brown & Jackson, and Spring Ram,
at which institutional shareholders engineered top management change
over the 1991-1993 period.152 The rough total of thirteen can be
taken as a plausible lower bound, but we do not know how much the
press missed.
One can also ask how often a particular institution intervenes, or
is solicited to intervene by other institutions. In 1991, testifying
before the House of Commons, Michael Sandland, the current
chairman of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee, was asked
"how often the institutional shareholders are using this threat [of
removing the board]?" He answered that he did not know what other
institutions were doing, but was pressed to estimate how often his
firm had engaged in such a threat. He responded:
We saw over the last year there have been two, possibly three,
confrontations which have reached public notice.
As to the
numbers of serious or possibly robust discussions which have not
surfaced in the press or wider public I find it very difficult, maybe
a dozen.153

Following up on this estimate, we asked all our interviewees how
often they had been approached within the last twelve months to join
152
See Blair (1992), supra note 141 (naming Great Western Resources); Jackson (1991),
supra note 10, at 18 (reporting the ouster of the Budgens chairman at the instigation of Electra,
IEP, and Gartmore; also naming Asda and Scicon); Walsh (1991), supra note 19, at 9 (reporting
that the Granada CEO was replaced to enable a rights offering to succeed, and that Schroders was
the key figure in the investor revolt); Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12 (naming Pentos,
Alexon, BET, Bunzl, and Amber Day). In a few of these cases, press accounts name only
unidentified institutional investors, and there is some ambiguity over whether the board acted on
its own, or only because it was pushed.
153

TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, supra note 94, at 278.
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an informal coalition to pressure a company's management or board
for specific changes or reforms. The highest estimate we received was
from the activist fund manager who told us not to underestimate the
power of a 3% shareholder. He said that his firm had received six
such requests within the past year. In two cases, this process resulted
in the coalition's indicating to the board that it intended to convene an
emergency general meeting to remove board members, as in Tace. In
each of these two instances, the threat worked, the desired
management changes were achieved, and no special meeting was
called. A major insurer, in contrast, although widely recognized as an
activist within its peer group of leading investors, reported that it had
joined an institutional coalition only once or twice a year over the
past two years. However, this insurer also had as many as twenty
discussions a year with one or more other institutions about the need
to "strengthen the boards" firms in its portfolio.
Several factors could explain the different behavior of these
institutions. One involves the composition of their respective equity
portfolios. The insurance company invests heavily in Britain's largest
companies, while the activist fund manager specializes in emerging,
higher- technology growth companies. It is harder to build a coalition
to remove the CEO of a major British corporation than in the case of
a smaller firm, and much harder to keep the coalition out of the
public eye. The effort will take more time, more effort, more legal
and investment banking fees, and pose a greater risk of reprisal from
management's allies.
These concerns may outweigh the larger
financial gains that are possible by improving a larger firm's
management. Second, for smaller companies, a coalition of four or
five investors, who are often in regular contact anyway, may already
hold a large enough block to be virtually assured of success. In
contrast, to be decisive at a major firm, a shareholder coalition would
have to have more members. Third, fraud, self-dealing, and gross
managerial incompetence may simply be more frequent for emerging
companies than for well-established firms. Finally, because of the
insurance company's size and prestige, its own voice may carry
sufficient "clout" with the board, even without a coalition behind it,
but with the implicit threat that a coalition could be built.
Other institutions, when asked how often they had joined or been
approached to join a shareholder coalition, sought to redefine the
question. One large fund manager drew a distinction, similar to that
offered by Sandland, between conferences with a group of other
institutions about a specific company and a coalition that actively
opposes the board. The manager estimated that the fund participated
in a dozen private conferences a year with other institutions
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concerning British companies, but rarely was involved in active
confrontation with a board. To call an emergency general meeting of
shareholders, the manager said, was an "extraordinarily rare step."
Our interviews also probed for differences in behavior between
externally managed corporate pension funds and the quasi-public
pension funds associated with formerly nationalized industries, which
have either an in-house staff or a long-term relationship with an
essentially captive adviser. Few major differences emerged. The inhouse manager of a quasi-public pension fund described itself as
having received "less than six" requests to join such a coalition over
the past two years. Given this fund's activist reputation, it would
seem a logical candidate for another dissatisfied institution to contact.
The fund had itself on two occasions within the last year sought to
assemble an institutional group to persuade firms to add nonexecutive
directors to their boards. In general, the quasi-public pension funds
expressed a stronger interest in intervening with regard to general
corporate governance issues such as board structure, even when the
subject corporation is performing well, than did fund managers who
were affiliated with merchant banks.
All in all, the formation of institutional coalitions can be
described as an out-of-the-ordinary event — neither extraordinary nor
frequent. Informal contacts with management or the board that never
reach the stage of coalition building are more frequent — we have
heard estimates as high as thirty to forty times per year — but still
reach only a small percentage of British firms in any given year.
Interviewees were also asked how large an institutional coalition
could be cohesively assembled. Florence and Scott had theorized that
the largest twenty shareholders could act, in Scott's phrase, as a
"controlling constellation."154 The interviewees estimated that forming
and maintaining a cohesive group became much more difficult above
about five or so members. The largest group that we know of is the
dozen institutions that supported Prudential in the Spring Ram episode
— when Prudential, perhaps wishing to avoid a repeat of the Tace
controversy, may have assembled a large group to convince a
recalcitrant board not to fight to the bitter end. Yet even here, there
were only four lead institutions named in the press accounts who,
when the need arose, assembled a larger number of less active
supporters.
What types of issues trigger the formation of a coalition? Most
interviewees responded that it usually took a financial crisis, including
a sharp decline in share price, or an event personally discrediting
154

SCOTT (1986), supra note 101, at 87.
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management to provoke the institutions into action.
One fund
manager suggested that coalitions could be formed to reverse
excessive diversification or to encourage the disposition of
unnecessary or unprofitable assets — "unbundling" in the current
British parlance — but we are not aware of any instance in which a
coalition has been formed with this as its principal goal. Only quasipublic pension funds such as Postel and the National Coal Board
described themselves as interested in seeking corporate governance
reforms unrelated to any change in management or strategic plans.
Lastly, our interviewees were invited to address when they would
intervene in a portfolio company's affairs and when they would
simply sell. Several responded to this question by focusing on the
size of their position — the smaller the position, the more attractive
the exit option would be. But it was clear that exit was a preferred
strategy for many. A comment by one major fund manager conveys
the attitude of many of his colleagues:
[A] dissatisfied portfolio manager will sell off if he doubts the
quality of a management. I would estimate that sale is far more
frequent than any . . . attempts to become involved in corporate
governance. There is at least a 10:1 ratio of sale over crisis
talks or group action or involvement. Group action occurs
when there is an unexpected crisis (either a performance crisis
or a corporate governance crisis). Both occur, but the interests
of our clients lead us to prefer taking the earlier step of selling
when we sense future problems, rather than waiting for a crisis.
We try to prevent a crisis or sell before it.
F. Summary
To the extent that our interviews can provide a look behind the
curtain, they suggest the following generalizations.
1. For most British institutions, activism is largely crisis driven.
The largest insurance firms — Prudential, Norwich, and Legal &
General — and a few large unit trusts — chiefly, M&G — engage in
regular proactive monitoring and press for governance changes
independent from a financial or operational crisis. But they have
limited resources and focus their efforts on poorly performing firms.
The prospering public corporation can resist corporate governance
reforms, if it wishes, with little fear of institutional intervention.155
155
Guinness, for example, recently elected a single chief executive and board chairman when
its old chief executive retired, despite institutional pressure to separate the two positions. See Jane
Simms, Management: Investor pressure builds on all-in-one executive, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug.
16, 1992, at 19. Similarly, Marks & Spencer recently combined the two positions after earlier
separating them. See Dobie (1991), supra note 60.
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2. The rate of shareholder interventions to replace management
appears to have risen in the last few years. This increase in activism
could reflect increased shareholder concentration, but it could also be
a cyclical response to the severe recession that plagued the British
economy until recently.156
3. With proxy fights rare and difficult to pull off, an important
source of institutions' power is their ability to reject a subscription
offering. Preemptive rights, which strike those schooled in finance
theory in the United States as unimportant, are central to U.K.
corporate governance. The effectiveness of this weapon depends on
laws and stock exchange rules protecting preemptive rights.
4. Absent a generally accepted mechanism for cost sharing, even
successful proxy battles, such as the Tace affair, can seem like
Pyrrhic victories to the institutions leading the charge. They will be
rare and conducted more for their deterrent value, or to respond to
unethical management conduct, than in the hope of direct profit.
5. Despite these obstacles, institutional coalitions — usually
small in number of participants but with substantial collective
shareholdings — do form. Their threat to oppose management and
even remove the board is credible and has repeatedly resulted in CEO
resignations.
6. Whenever possible, the institutions prefer to operate in the
shadows. The prevailing view, even among activist managers, is that
"secrecy and trust are essential."157
These conclusions may seem to produce a paradox: institutions
are highly reluctant to engage in public proxy battles, but corporations
consider the institutions' threat to employ such a weapon credible.
The paradox, however, is only superficial. There are other wellunderstood contexts in which one can credibly threaten a step that
will make one worse off. One such situation is when, by so doing,
one can force one's adversary to incur even greater expected costs.
This is the theory of nuisance litigation: if the plaintiff by expending
$1 can force the defense to expend $3, then the plaintiff may be able
to secure a settlement even in a weak case when the plaintiff would
not want to incur the expense of a trial.158 In the governance context,
whatever the costs of intervention to the institutions, the threatened
156
As Michael Sandland of Norwich Union put it in commenting on the recession's impact
on institutional activism: "At the start of the '90s, the tide went out. You walked along the wet
sand and found unmentionable things left behind." See Makin (1992), supra note 127, at 135.
157
158

Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12, at 5 (quoting Michael Bishop of Gartmore).

See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in which Suits are Brought for their Nuisance
Value, 5 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
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managers of their portfolio companies have even more at stake. They
stand to lose jobs, perquisites, and professional reputations. Hence,
they are not eager to completely rebuff institutions, and gamble that
the institutions are bluffing, when the institutions threaten a voting
contest.
Moreover, the institutions may not be bluffing. In a repeated
game context, where the reputation you build today is critical to
future success, major institutions might pursue a proxy fight that is
uneconomic apart from its deterrence value for future cases. Indeed,
the need to preserve one's reputation can be used as a tactical weapon
to convince a recalcitrant board not to force the matter to the end
stage of a proxy fight. For example, by going public in Spring Ram,
Prudential, and Lazard Freres put themselves in a position in which a
proxy fight became preferable to surrendering to Spring Ram's
management.
This analysis — that both sides can lose from voting contests —
can explain the strong preference for behind-the-scenes settlements.
Both sides have reason to threaten steps that are costly to them,
hoping that a bluff will work. Publicity may lock either or both sides
into positions they would prefer only to hint at and not overtly
threaten. By bargaining in the shadows, costs, including reputational
damage to individuals and institutions, can be minimized.
V. THE LIMITS ON INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM
This Part will examine in greater detail the factors that affect the
formation of institutional coalitions and other forms of institutional
involvement in corporate governance. Our interview data suggests
that coalition formation is relatively infrequent and that coalitions are
small, rarely more than four or five members.
Moreover, many
British firms persist in practices — notably diversification with poor
results — that could elicit institutional objection, but generally do not.
Instead, the limited resource of institutional attention is focused on
the worst performers and on cases tinged with scandal or self-dealing.
A. Direct and Indirect Costs of Coordination
As noted earlier, Norwich Union and Framlington were forced to
divide a £60,000 bill for the Tace proxy fight. Collectively, these
two firms held roughly 20% of Tace. They had obtained the proxies
of an additional 20% — but not the agreement of these other
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shareholders to share expenses.159 This fact pattern underscores two
distinct problems:
First, there is the classic free-rider problem.
Even with a
substantial 20% stake between them, Norwich Union and Framlington
would have to value the gains to Tace from replacing the old board at
more than £300,000 before incurring a £60,000 cost would make
economic sense, even if ultimate success were certain. This may help
to explain why activist institutions usually try to develop a 15%-20%
coalition before seeking a formal meeting with outside directors. A
request by a smaller group would be less credible, in part, because a
small group is unlikely to be willing to incur significant expenditures.
A successful effort to obtain control of the board may lead to expense
reimbursement, but this did not happen in Tace because an
independent bidder acquired the firm.
Moreover, campaigns not
directed at control do not carry even the possibility of expense
reimbursement, though costs are probably lower as well.
The economics of a proxy campaign look better if one considers
that the investors' action will demonstrate their credibility and deter
managers of other firms from engaging in conduct adverse to
shareholder interests. Nonetheless, the smaller the stake, the greater
the expected gain must be before shareholders can justify incurring
any costs. Moreover, much of the benefit from general deterrence
will flow to one's competitors. Yet, as we discuss below, many
money managers care as much about relative performance as about
the absolute return on monitoring expenditures.
Second, the Tace battle underlines the difficulty that institutions
face in seeking agreement on cost sharing, even if they agree on the
desired substantive outcome. One problem, our interviewees told us,
is that pension fund managers lack the authority to spend pension
assets on a proxy campaign. Of course, a fund manager could request
authority from pension trustees, but this puts the fund manager in a
doubly uncomfortable position: (i) perhaps implicitly warranting the
success of the intervention, and (ii) having to justify the proposed
actions to pension fund trustees who themselves may be corporate
officers and potential targets of such activism.
Our interviewees
stressed that pension fund management is intensively competitive. In
addition, a successful fund manager will have many clients, making it
time-consuming to solicit the consent of each. As a result, fund
managers rarely ask pension fund trustees for an additional
contribution to fund governance activism.
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If proxy campaigns were common, fund managers could seek
such authority ex ante as part of their basic contract. But up to now,
overt action has been infrequent. Moreover, there are advantages to
being unable to contribute to a campaign oneself, when others are not
so constrained.
If a pension fund manager does not seek reimbursement from its
clients for expenses, then the expected benefit must be huge to justify
the manager incurring any expense. Assume for example that: (i) a
pension fund manager holds a 1% stake worth £10 million in a
particular firm; and (ii) the proposed intervention will raise the value
of this holding by 10%, or £1 million. It is in the clients' interest to
contribute £30,000 to a joint shareholder fund to finance the
intervention. But is it in the fund manager's interest to do so?
U.K. fund managers are typically compensated, like their U.S.
counterparts, on the basis of a percentage of funds under management,
and incentive compensation is rarely used. Suppose that a manager
receives an annual fee equal to 1% of the assets it manages.160 A £1
million increase in the fund's asset value will increase the fund
manager's annual fee by £10,000. This expected but uncertain annual
gain of £10,000 may or may not induce the fund manager to advance
£30,000 of its own, but clearly its incentives are different from those
of its clients, whose expected gain is £1,000,000. In short, agency
costs at the fund-manager level can result in underfunding of
collective action that it would be rational for the investors in the fund
to undertake.
To be sure, a fund manager that undertakes successful
shareholder interventions may attract new clients and thus increase
funds under management. But other fund managers also benefit from
the successful intervention, so the fund manager's relative performance
versus his "free riding" rivals may not be improved.
Also, a
reputation as a shareholder activist is a dubious marketing tool in a
world in which corporate managers, who may be skeptical of such
activism, control most pension fund assets.
This agency-cost explanation for passivity may partly explain
why British insurers have been, on the whole, more activist than
pension fund managers. Because they primarily manage their own
money, they need only consider whether the costs of activism are
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Actual pension management fees are usually lower than this. See Cohen, supra note 56,
at 6 (typical "pure" charges are 0.2%- 0.5% per year; smaller accounts and accounts invested in
overseas assets may pay total fees of up to 1% per year.
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justified by the direct benefits to them as investors (rather than as
agents of investors).
That many British insurers are mutual companies could also help
to explain their relative activism.161
Mutual companies have no
shareholders and thus may thus be less subject to cost constraints that
limit their activism as investors.
Their managements may have
discretion to pursue policies, including corporate governance policies,
that they consider correct, even if this means bearing some costs for
free riders.
In this freedom from shareholder oversight, British
mutual insurers parallel to a degree U.S. public pension funds, which
have been the most active American institutions. Although we do not
mean to suggest that the solution to corporate governance problems is
to insulate the watchers from market oversight, it is ironic that some
of the most active monitors in both the United States and Britain are,
to varying degrees, exempt from such oversight themselves.
In theory, incentive compensation can reduce these agency-cost
problems. A fund manager who turns around a portfolio company
might receive, for example, some percentage of the gain — say 10%
— instead of a few basis points. In the United States, incentive
compensation for fund managers is limited by SEC rules,162 but in the
United Kingdom, there is no legal prohibition on incentive
compensation. Yet incentive compensation is rarely used. When we
asked fund managers why, the most common explanation involved the
clients' predictable response when the topic was raised. Clients ask
"what they get by paying more." The fund manager cannot promise
that clients who pay incentive compensation will receive higher
returns or better service than other customers without offending the
latter — and possibly legal rules as well. Because all clients must be
treated more or less alike or the disfavored will leave, the manager
must convince most clients to pay the incentive compensation or else
stay with a standard fee structure. This may be more trouble than it
is worth. Perhaps too, though they did not say so, fund managers
know that clients will want incentive compensation to be a two-way
street, and prefer to charge less risky, asset-based fees.
The indirect costs of shareholder activism may be even more
important than the direct costs.
Forming and maintaining a
shareholder coalition takes a substantial amount of time. Diplomatic
niceties require that contacts between institutions be conducted by
161
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Norwich Union, for example, is a mutual.

Investment Advisers Act Rule 205-3, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205 -3 (1993); see Coffee (1991),
supra note 3, at 1362- 66.
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senior executives. The time so consumed reduces the time available
to contact existing or prospective clients or review other stocks in the
institution's portfolio. One veteran of these battles believes that the
institution seeking to assemble the coalition must win the support of
"three of the top five institutional shareholders in the company" in
order to a form a minimally credible coalition.163
But this only
begins the process. The investment officer who is seeking to form
the coalition must also meet and consult with (1) the company's
management, (2) his firm's clients, (3) other senior officers within his
own institution, and (4) potential allies among institutional investors.
The investment officer must convince his firm's senior management,
the firm's clients, or both, to commit funds for professional fees.
Resistance from both groups is common.164
The effort to win the support of uncommitted institutions will
consume still more time. Both sides are apt to hold meetings with
them. The company will then most likely announce some changes
and reforms. But are these reforms substantive or only cosmetic?
All members of the embryonic coalition will need to confer over this
question, and some may drop out. Meanwhile, the company will
unleash its own solicitors and investment bankers. If the dispute
becomes public, the media will be drawn into the fray. All this for a
dispute involving only one stock in the portfolio of an institution
owning, in all likelihood, several hundred stocks. There is also an
important hidden cost: other company managers may become less
open with your institution because they fear that if you learn adverse
information, you may demand a management shake-up.165
Inevitably, these costs must be passed on to clients in some form.
Meanwhile, rival firms can free ride on the activist fund manager's
efforts, while focusing on their core business of securities research
and stock picking.
B. Conflicts of Interest
Many pension fund managers are affiliated with merchant
banking firms. If the parent merchant bank represents a company in
the fund manager's portfolio or a firm involved in a takeover bid for
that company, an actual or potential conflict of interest exists. All
fund managers are always seeking new corporate business, and
merchant banks are always seeking new securities underwriting
163

Blair (1992), supra note 141, at 13.

164

Id.

165

Id.

2060

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 92:1994

clients. Mutual funds, too, often seek to manage pension money.
When soliciting corporate clients, a reputation as a troublemaker is
something devoutly to be wished on one's competitors and avoided for
oneself. A merchant bank's optimum public profile, in the words of
one banker, is "below the level of the floor."166
Thus, it is not surprising that in Britain, as in the United States,
most corporate pension plans follow a variant of the golden rule:
"Do unto other companies as you would have their pension funds do
unto your company."167 In other words, support management. British
corporate pension plans are not subject to even the minimal regulatory
oversight provided in the United States by the Department of Labor,
which requires that pension plan trustees cast informed votes and vote
in the interests of plan beneficiaries, not the corporate sponsor.168
As some interviewees remarked, some of the most active pension
fund and mutual fund managers have foreign parents and are less
affected by these conflicts. For example, Gartmore (affiliated with
Banque Indosuez, a French investment bank) and Phillips & Drew
(owned by Union Bank of Switzerland) are among the most active
pension fund managers, and Fidelity Investments Ltd. (affiliated with
U.S.-based Fidelity Group) led the Brown & Jackson campaign.
In contrast, several interviewees suggested that the relatively low
profile on corporate governance issues of Mercury Asset Management,
the largest British pension fund manager, reflected its status as a
75%-owned subsidiary of SG Warburg, a major British investment
bank. A high profile might cost both Mercury and Warburg some
current or future clients.
There was also a potential for
embarrassment if Mercury disagreed with Warburg's advice to a
corporate client. Possibly as a result, Mercury, we are told, prefers
not to keep voting power for the shares it manages. Yet what counts
as relative passivity in Britain might be considered activist in the
United States — Mercury recently joined a group of institutions that
successfully demanded management change at Alexon Group as the
price of a rights offering's success.169
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Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12, at 5.
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JAMES E. HEARD & HOWARD D. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY
VOTING SYSTEM (Investor Responsibility Research Ctr. 1987); O'BARR & CONLEY (1992), supra
note 40, at 200; see also Black (1990), supra note 2, at 595 - 98.
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See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., THE ISS PROXY VOTING MANUAL 1.71.21 (3d ed. 1993) (reviewing Department of Labor guidelines).
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See Roland Rudd, Institutions force management change at Alexon Group, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 1993, at 19; see also Weever & Amoore (1993), supra note 12, at 5 (reporting on
Mercury's role in pushing out the founder and CEO of Pentos).
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There is little evidence of overt corporate retaliation or pressure
on the more active institutions. British commentators largely discount
the possibility that pension plan trustees — even though they are
often the corporation's own officers — would directly seek to
influence how an external manager votes.170 Although a merchant
bank's self-interest may counsel passivity even without overt pressure
from its clients, there is a countervailing pressure:
relative
performance is the principal benchmark of success in competing for
pension accounts. Some activist firms, notably Fidelity and Gartmore,
have attracted substantial business away from older, more established
firms.
In the United States, some companies have chosen to keep voting
in-house. Outside money managers pick stocks; corporate officers
vote them. The self- evident purpose is to ensure promanager votes.
Splitting stock-picking and voting in this way appears uncommon in
Britain. However, conflicts may underlie the common requirement
that pension fund managers consult clients before they cast
"contentious" antimanager votes or spend plan assets on a governance
campaign.
A contract that discourages activism is likely to be
congenial to corporate managers, who may worry that activism will be
targeted at them.
Although the conflicts issue rears its head most noticeably in the
case of pension fund managers, insurance companies are not immune,
partly because they are active pension fund managers. In the early
1990s, Prudential ran an advertisement in newspapers stating that out
of 480 tender offer bids since 1984, it had failed to support
management in only around twenty-five cases. Referring to this ad in
testimony before the House of Commons, Michael Sandland of
Norwich Union responded that out of 385 tender offers since 1984,
Norwich had failed to support management in only eleven cases.171
Both these statistics and the marketing effort to present them to the
public suggest the possibility of compromised loyalty.
C. The "Race to the Exit" Scenario
Several interviewees stressed that one danger in assembling a
shareholder coalition was that approaching others to join a coalition
170

See RICHARD MINNS, PENSION FUNDS AND BRITISH CAPITALISM 104 (1980) ("[V] oting
is in effect what the managing institutions choose to make it."); SCOTT (1986), supra note 101,
at 25. Under the Trustee Investment Act, virtually all trustees, including pension plan trustees,
must have advisers qualified to provide written advice on proposed investments. Scott argues that
this strengthens the hand of the external manager. Id. at 31 n.43.
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would trigger a race to sell among institutions. As they viewed it,
the information that a major shareholder was dissatisfied had an
overhang effect: the proponent might sell its stock if it did not
secure satisfactory reforms, thereby depressing the stock's price. Such
an overhanging block could induce other investors to sell first. This
danger forces institutions to be careful whom they invite to take
collective action, lest the invitations trigger a "race to the exit."172
This worry forces the coalition builders to narrow the field of
potential partners, thus further complicating the process of forming a
coalition. Most considered selling in such a setting to be unethical
and possibly to constitute unlawful insider trading.173 They insisted
that they and their usual allies would not sell their shares if so
approached, but strongly implied that others might not be so ethical.
In the U.S. securities market, with its greater dispersion of
ownership, the information that a 3%-5% shareholder may soon sell
seems likely to have only a modest impact on share price, unless the
blockholder is thought to possess inside information. Within the more
cohesive and institutionally dominated U.K. market, knowledge of a
large institution's impending sale could plausibly trigger a sell-off by
other institutions if either: (i) other institutions believed that the
selling institution had adverse private information about the company;
or (ii) liquidation of the institution's block would significantly alter
the balance of supply and demand for the stock, producing a short to
medium term price decline.
For example, if Prudential asked other institutions to join with it
to change a particular company's managers, the institution receiving
such a request might assume that Prudential — which regularly meets
with company managers — had reasonable grounds for dissatisfaction.
The process of management change could take from several months to
more than a year to unfold, during which time negative assessments
of the company would appear in the press, and its stock price would
172
One fund manager phrased this concern as follows:
You must remember that in communicating dissatisfaction, you are possibly giving a
signal of your future intentions. Would the person you are talking to abuse the
information by trading on it? You have to fear a race for the exit in which you will be
last by staying to challenge management.
173
Section 57(2) of the recently passed Criminal Justice Act 1993 defines insider to include
shareholders. See 30 HALSBURY'S CURRENT STAT. (1994), supra note 83, Money tit., at 15 ("[A]
person has information from an inside source if ... he has it through ... being a director, employee,
or shareholder."). Commentators have noted that this provision "cover[s] cases where ... a
shareholder declines a secret approach to sell his stake to a potential bidder but nevertheless trades
on the basis that a forthcoming bid for the company is likely to be made." Wotherspoon (1994),
supra note 83, at 425.
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likely fall. On the other hand, disclosure of the formation of an
institutional coalition to revitalize a slumping company could increase
the target's share value, much like a rumor of a takeover or a control
contest. It is an empirical question whether the gains are larger from
selling or from fighting, and we have no reason to second-guess fund
managers' belief that negative price pressure will dominate at least
some of the time.
D. "Underweighting" as a Cause of Passivity
We have already noted that "overweighted" institutions are
expected to take the lead role in shareholder intervention, and
underweighted institutions are unlikely to participate in a shareholder
coalition.
Prudential, the largest British institution, holds around
3.5% of all publicly traded British equities.
As a mathematical
necessity, Prudential's average holding in public corporations that it
invests in will be at least 3.5%. It will hold more than a 3.5% stake
in some firms and less than a 3.5% stake in others. In the former
case, it is said in the parlance of the City to be "overweighted," and
in the latter to be "underweighted."
It is no surprise that firms that have large percentage stakes tend
to be the activists that organize shareholder coalitions. A larger stake
gives them a larger incentive. Overweighting certainly correlates with
a large percentage stake.
But why should underweighted firms
necessarily be passive?
After all, an institution could be
underweighted in a corporation, and yet still hold 2%- 3% of the
corporation's shares and be among its largest shareholders.
The passivity of underweighted institutions has a clear economic
logic: Institutions are locked in a competition for investors' funds,
which turns largely on relative performance. Thus, no institution
wants to help its competitors at its own expense. A firm that shares
the costs of a shareholder coalition when it is underweighted will
benefit not only the usual free riders but, more importantly, rivals
who are fully weighted or overweighted in the stock. For example, a
fund manager that turns around a company in which it owns a 2%
stake, compared to a 3% stake in the market, gains less than half as
much in relative terms as a smaller rival that owns 1.5% of the
company but only 1% of the market.
Once again, action that would benefit the manager's clients is
chilled because it does not benefit the manager. Nor can incentive
compensation solve this problem, as long as compensation depends on
relative performance. Restricted diversification would make a manager
more likely to be overweighted in the firms that it invests in, but a
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manager as large as Prudential may, almost of necessity, own most of
the British market and thus be underweighted in many firms.
If one takes the logic of over- or underweighting to its logical
conclusion, an underweighted fund manager may not even want to
improve a portfolio company's performance. Presumably, the manager
will hold such a stake principally for diversification or to be a closet
indexer who cannot outperform or underperform competitors by very
much. Our interviewees did not express this heretical view — that
one might be indifferent to whether a portfolio company does well.
A money manager's active expression of this perspective would also
violate fiduciary duties and cultural norms and might boomerang if
clients became aware of the behavior.
Still, this perspective
underscores the reluctance of underweighted firms to participate in a
shareholder coalition.
E. Coalitions Among Rivals
More generally, competitors may simply find it hard to cooperate.
The most important British institutional investors — insurance
companies and pension fund managers — compete intensely for
investor funds. It is impossible to verify whether the natural rivalry
between competitors affects their ability to cooperate, when they have
common corporate governance interests, but some interviewees felt
that this factor created a psychological barrier to cooperation.
Moreover, the logic of over- and underweighting often causes interests
to diverge as well.
Concerns like these might explain why British institutions are
reluctant to nominate their own slates of directors. Gartmore's fund
managers might feel uneasy about placing Robert Fleming's nominees
on the board of a company in which Gartmore holds a substantial
stake, for fear that Robert Fleming would gain an informational
advantage. Such an advantage need not involve actionable — and
unethical — insider trading. Directors inevitably have better soft
information about a company's prospects and can convey that
information, or a resulting buy or sell recommendation, to traders in a
variety of low-visibility ways.
F. Legal Barriers
Legal rules can affect the institutions' choice between holding
debt and equity, the size of the stakes that the institutions own, and
what they can do with those stakes. The effects are interrelated —
institutions that are limited in what they can do have less incentive to
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own large, influential stakes.
Britain today has few significant
obstacles to owning equity or to holding large stakes, and only loose
constraints on what the institutions can do.174
The principal legal concerns are insider-trading liability and
control-person liability.
The institutions' fear of inadvertently
receiving inside information, which would prevent them from trading,
inhibits communication between shareholders and managers. Adverse
publicity is also a concern: no one wants to be publicly accused of
unethical behavior, even if no legal liability results.
Insider-trading related impediments to information flow can both
limit and channel institutional oversight. Less-informed institutions,
recognizing their own ignorance, will take action only in clear cases.
They will tend to favor structural reforms, such as independent board
chairmen, over intervention in specific corporate decisions.
But
without insider trading restrictions, major shareholders might use an
informational edge, not to improve oversight, but instead to earn
short-term trading profits.
Although insider-trading concerns could inhibit money managers
from serving as directors, such concerns seem a weak explanation for
why money managers do not sit on corporate boards. One could
construct a Chinese wall to shield the director from the institution's
traders, and the threat of litigation is low in Britain to begin with.
A second potential legal concern is control-person liability.
Although there is little caselaw, the perceived risk depends both on
what you do and on how much you own.
Some commentators
suggest that institutions do not want to nominate board members or
get too involved in a company's business decisions, because of this
potential liability.175 Most of our interviewees denied that controlperson liability entered their thinking, but this potential liability could
reinforce the reluctance of some to hold very large (over 10%) stakes.
The principal reasons why few money managers sit on corporate
boards seem to be nonlegal. Those interviewed stressed that they
lacked the expertise to make or review decisions for industrial
companies.
Other reasons include lack of need, because major
174
We discussed industry-specific rules in Part II and the general framework of company law
and securities regulation in Part III; we do not repeat that discussion here.
175
See, e.g., William Kay, Money men who rule the business world, THE TIMES (London),
Apr. 20, 1992, at 25 ("Fund managers ... are still frightened of being accused of trying to run the
companies in which they invest. There is a legal reason for that. An outsider deemed to have a
direct influence in how a company is managed can be as liable as the directors for any
wrongdoing.").
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shareholders can already speak directly to corporate officers and
nonexecutive directors; lack of time, because senior executives at
major institutions can only serve on a few boards, and even that
comes with a cost in attention to clients and to other, perhaps more
troubled firms; and a desire to maintain objectivity and not become
loyal to a stock that a neutral observer would sell.
G. The Role of Political History
Mark Roe has reported that much industry-specific regulation
adopted in the United States since the late nineteenth century was
expressly intended to weaken the power of financial institutions as
shareholders.176 This American history raises the question of whether
a similar story can be told in Britain.
Researching the political
history of legal controls on different financial institutions in Great
Britain is a massive task; we offer here only such clues as we have
found in the course of our research.
Our tentative view is that a political desire to limit bank
concentration may have played a role, early in the twentieth century,
in limiting the size of British banks.
Fear of bank power was
prominent in British socialist thought early in the twentieth century.
An important 1918 investigative committee chaired by Lord Colwyn,
perhaps inspired by the 1912 Pujo investigation in the United States,
produced a report on bank influence, the Colwyn Report, that urged
that bank concentration be limited. No law to that effect ever passed,
but large banks knew that the Bank of England would frown on and
likely reject their merger proposals.177 Banks stayed smaller and thus
could hold less equity.
The effect of limited bank size on equity holdings was buttressed
by the Bank of England's post-World War II decision not to count
equity toward regulatory capital (we do not know the motives for that
decision).
As we discuss below, when regulatory strictures were
relaxed in the late 1970s, it may no longer have made economic sense
for banks to hold much equity.
We have not uncovered evidence of political concern specifically
focused on the power of British insurers and mutual funds, who have
never been subjected to American-style legal restrictions. The hobblethe-large-institutions political story is also weak for pension funds.
Funded British pensions arose at the beginning of the twentieth
176

See Roe (1993), supra note 28; Roe (1993), supra note 44; Roe (1991), supra note 25;
Roe (1991), supra note 2.
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For a review of this history, see JERRY COAKLEY & LAURENCE HARRIS, THE CITY OF
CAPITAL 171-77 (1983).
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century.
Large employers took the initiative in presenting new
pension schemes to employees.178
There was little regulation, so
employers simply adapted existing trust law.179 Employer motives
included fending off organized labor, convincing Parliament to limit
tax-funded retirement benefits, and ensuring a stable labor force
(pension benefits were typically forfeited if an employee quit).
Union-controlled pension plans coexisted with company plans,
but company plans won out over the long haul. Although some
unions opposed company-managed plans, others saw company plans as
a valuable employee benefit. Funding crises caused many union plans
to shrink or disappear. Company plans had similar crises, but were
usually bailed out by the corporate parent; union plans had no deep
pocket to look to for help.
In sum, a direct political story for why British institutions are
less powerful than their Japanese and German counterparts can be
told principally for banks, and even there only in muted form. But
perhaps an indirect story can be told. Fear of political retaliation
could contribute to institutional passivity, and to institutional
reluctance to act publicly. Prudential's chairman worried publicly in
1970 that there might be a "political reaction to any strong display of
influence exercised over companies in which [Prudential had]
holdings."180 Writing in the mid-1980s, Farrar and Russell opined:
"Institutional investors are worried about the political consequences of
an exercise of power. They eschew public criticism and fear public
intervention."181
This concern partly reflected the longstanding threat of
nationalization.
Many prominent industries were nationalized by
Labour governments; the City was often threatened.182 As recently as
1976, the Labour Party's Executive Committee proposed nationalizing
the seven largest insurers.183 Such threats could lead large institutions
to avoid publicity — even favorable publicity would call attention to
178
The discussion below of the history of British pension plans draws primarily on HANNAH
(1986), supra note 24.
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The tax benefits for pension plans came later, in 1921, when employers who had already
adopted funded plans convinced Parliament to make both pension contributions and the income
on the trust corpus exempt from income tax.
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the City's influence — and cultivate corporate managers as allies
rather than possible opponents.
Concern over nationalization today seems minimal. The media
has strongly supported the institutions in their efforts to upgrade
corporate governance standards, backed them in the Tace affair, and
even criticized the Cadbury report for adopting only advisory, not
mandatory, standards. Many industries have been privatized, and the
Labour party has moved toward the political center to regain political
viability. The alleged "short-termism" of institutional investors was a
rallying cry for corporate managers during the late 1980s, but this
theme has disappeared from the popular debate with a decline in the
frequency of takeovers.
Still, this political history could help to
explain how British institutions grew up. In a path-dependent world,
how they grew up could continue to influence how they behave today.
Although nationalization seems unlikely, stricter regulation
remains a significant threat. Jonathan Charkham, long the Bank of
England's chief adviser on corporate governance, recently worried that
"to the extent that the institutions do become effective, there may be
a backlash against their exercise of influence."184 The institutions
understand too that the Labour party might win the next election, and
the party's leaders continue to refer to the City's influence in policy
documents, not with approval.185 When the heads of Prudential and
Norwich Union boast before Parliament of their record in favoring
management in a takeover bid,186 they may hope to curry favor with
Parliament as much as with corporate managers.
H. Organizational Capability
A final reason why British institutions do not intervene very
often in portfolio companies involves organizational and logistical
constraints on their capacity to monitor corporate managers. Even the
largest insurance companies have small research staffs. For example,
Norwich Union, the catalyst in the Tace affair and the manager of a
£24 billion portfolio, recently expanded its staff of researchers who
support its fund managers to twelve full- time persons; as of 1986, it
had none.187 Similarly, Prudential, which manages a portfolio more
than twice as large, estimated for us that it employed around twenty
full-time professional analysts, including its senior staff, to perform
184
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research and security analysis.
Yet, these insurers hold globally
diversified portfolios containing hundreds of U.K. stocks and many
foreign stocks as well. There is a mismatch between staffing and
portfolio size — at least if one expects serious monitoring.
No
institutional investor that we interviewed had a professional research
staff that remotely rivaled the credit analysis and workout staffs of a
commercial bank of comparable size.188
Staffing constraints mean that monitoring resources are usually
allocated to emergency cases, often companies that are near
insolvency. This, in turn, reinforces the importance of preemptive
rights. For thinly staffed money management firms, the news of an
impending subscription offering can signal potential trouble and alerts
shareholders to take a close look at the offering firm, at the same
time that the offering gives investors the leverage to force changes.
In the long run, of course, small staffs cannot explain limited
oversight. We must ask why the institutions do not expand their
research and security analysis staffs — as indeed some recently
have.189 But only a quantum leap in research capability would leave
them in a position comparable to a major commercial bank.
Presumably, the major insurers and pension fund managers believe
that such a research and oversight capability is not economically
justifiable. The unresolved question is why.
Even if they cannot greatly increase the staff effort devoted to
monitoring, institutions could monitor more intensely by holding
larger stakes in fewer companies, with only a trivial loss in
diversification. No such trend is evident, however. This implies that
British institutions either value liquidity highly or believe that the
gains from more intensive monitoring are small. Several different
reasons could plausibly underlie this assessment.
First, the expected value of extending oversight beyond the most
troubled firms is uncertain.
Investors' perception of management
weakness is always tinged with uncertainty. Perhaps management is
doing a competent job in difficult circumstances. Or perhaps its
mistakes cannot be easily fixed. If a fatal mistake has been made, the
institutions may do better to sell and cut their losses than to stay and
fight — a sentiment expressed to us repeatedly by fund managers,
though not by insurers.
188

One explanation for the difference in bank and insurer staffing could be the number of
significant investments. We lack information on the relative size of bank loan portfolios and
money manager equity portfolios, but our sense is that banks are probably less, or at least no
more, diversified than insurers and money managers. If so, this cannot explain why banks are
more thickly staffed.
189

See Punters' progress (1991), supra note 55, at 88.
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Second, intervention can sometimes aggravate the problem,
consuming scarce managerial time and creating unfavorable publicity.
Nor is it possible to put a financial value on most intervention. In
the face of such uncertainty, it may make sense to intervene only at
the crisis stage, when there is more upside potential and less
downside risk.
Third, in a competitive market for financial management services,
a fund manager cannot charge more than its peers for its services
unless it can demonstrate a better performance record. Here we come
back to free riding and agency costs at the money manager level. A
fund manager can outperform its rivals through corporate governance
intervention only if it is overweighted in the company's stock. Even
then, rivals will share in the gains. Overweighting, however, requires
some sacrifice of liquidity. Institutional investors told us that they
lose liquidity in smaller stocks even at a 5wnership level. Thus, even
if undervalued stocks are hard to find in a relatively efficient market,
fund managers may still have an incentive to invest in a lowprobability search for them because they do not need to share the
gains from search, rather than to expend funds on collective action.
The free-rider problem becomes less significant as shareholder
concentration increases, because it is easier to coordinate actions and
prorate costs among the principal institutions. From this perspective,
it is significant that British concentration levels, though higher than
American levels, are substantially below those in Germany. Although
German institutional investors own directly only 14% of publicly
traded stock,190 there are only three "universal" banks, and they vote
as nominees, on average, 45% of the stock present at the shareholders'
meetings in the 100 largest German corporations.191 Collective action
is surely easier in this context. Moreover, the marginal costs of
activism may be less for a German universal bank than for a British
insurer because the bank already incurs monitoring costs as a creditor.
In Britain, most fund managers and insurers are not significant lenders
190
See Neville Nankivell, Good governance translates into good business, FIN. POST, Jan.
6, 1993, § 1, at 9.
191
See Theodor Baums, The German Banking System and Its Impacts on Corporate Finance
and Governance 30-31 (Feb. 1993) (unpublished paper, Instituted fur Handel-und
Wirtschaftsrecht, on file with authors). In addition, the stock voted by all banks at these meetings
averaged 82.67%. Id. In only one case, Baums finds, did banks vote less than a majority of the
shares present at the meeting. Id.
It should not be assumed, however, that the German pattern is optimal. Agency problems can
arise when a monitor has voting power far greater than its equity ownership. For example, a
German bank that owns 5% of a company's stock but votes 50% may discourage the company
from taking risks, in order to protect the bank's position as a creditor, or the bank may tolerate
inefficient diversification, which reduces its risk as a creditor.
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to the same firms, so these economies of monitoring cannot be
realized.
A further reason for limited investment in monitoring portfolio
companies involves path-dependent organizational design. Any sizable
institution is constrained in the things that it does well and the degree
to which it can evolve by its existing infrastructure.
In our
interviews, we probed to find the kinds of interventions that fund
managers consider feasible. When we asked if institutional investors
would challenge the strategic business plans of a nonfailing company,
fund managers told us in remarkably similar language: "We are stock
traders, not business experts; there are limits to what we can do."
Essentially, these are limits on the firm's human capital, as
shaped by the organization's history, structure, and surrounding
culture. Consider merchant banks, for example. Like U.S. investment
banks, they have long seen their comparative advantage to lie in
trading and providing financial services. During the 1980s, trading
profits grew at U.S. investment banks, with the explosion in new,
complex securities and resulting arbitrage opportunities. A similar
pattern, we believe, characterized U.K. merchant banks. As a result,
these firms' capital moved toward trading and away from
underwriting. With this change, political power within the firms also
shifted to traders. Yet, traders see illiquid, long-term investments as a
classic mistake. By training and harsh experience, traders know that
markets fluctuate and that one must maintain liquidity and cut losses
when necessary.
In the trader's culture, one does not resist the
market's judgment over even the medium term in the hopes of
securing ultimate vindication. In short, relational investing and the
trader's culture are fundamentally in tension.
The point here goes beyond the cautionary working rules by
which merchant banks have grown and prospered. The merchant
bank's human capital is focused on trading.
The merchant bank
develops expertise in predicting the future value of a corporation's
securities, but much of that expertise is focused on the near term.
The merchant bank need not simultaneously develop the capacity or
inclination to intervene and restructure the corporation, save perhaps
in extreme cases.
An argument about the limited human capital of money
management firms takes one only so far. If the profits were attractive
enough, these firms could acquire the human capital needed to
rehabilitate mismanaged companies.
But organizational change is
difficult and risky. The new venture may fail; even worse, the effort
may dilute the firm's expertise in its current business. Nor is it clear
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that insurers or merchant banks should redeploy their human capital in
this way. There are no role models to convince merchant banks that
they can earn above-market returns through activist, long-term
investing.
The U.S. experience with leveraged buyouts is relevant in this
regard. During the 1980s, leveraged buyout firms evolved in the
United States — most prominently, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.
(KKR) and Forstmann Little & Co. — and undertook to restructure
diversified firms. Initially, U.S. investment banks firms advised and
financed the leveraged buyout firms but did not compete directly with
them. Only when they saw that enormous returns were possible did
the largest firms — Merrill Lynch, First Boston, and Shearson
Lehman — enter the field as buyout competitors. Similarly, British
merchant banks seem likely to become relational investors and
undertake to restructure faltering British companies only if some new
entrant first demonstrates that large profits are attainable. As one
fund manager told us, "Until you see that it works, you don't invest in
a theory."
Moreover, such a move, even if attempted, could well fail
because the imitators lack the institutional capabilities of the first
movers.
Leveraged buyouts again offer an instructive example:
leveraged acquisitions gone sour helped to drive Drexel Burnham into
bankruptcy and forced First Boston to turn to its then-40%
shareholder, Credit Suisse, for a bailout.192
Failing such a development, institutional activism in the United
Kingdom, we believe, will continue to be triggered primarily by clear
managerial failure, though management's margin for error may
diminish. The voices of institutional investors may help to establish
new corporate governance norms, like majority independent boards,
and to persuade laggard managers to accept the new norms. But
frequent proactive monitoring remains unlikely. Instead, the dialogue
between investors will remain a game of bluff and counterbluff, as
institutions threaten to take steps that both sides know are costly to
them.193
192
See Steven Greenhouse, Reviving a Humbled First Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1991,
at D1; Stephen Labaton, The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1990,
at D4; see also Bill Jamieson & Margareta Pagano, Gateway losing grocery battle, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, May 17, 1992, at 33 (describing Wasserstein Perella's disastrous acquisition of a
large stake in Gateway).
193
Others have disagreed with our conclusion that the relationship between investors and
managers will not change radically in the near future. Samuel Graves and Sandra Waddock argue
that institutional investors, and pension funds in particular, could become the "conglomerate of
the 1990s," paralleling the role of the main bank in the Japanese keiretsu. Samuel B. Graves &
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I. Are Banks Unique?
Although we have developed reasons why insurers and money
managers, which are the major equity holders in Britain, are thinly
staffed and likely to remain so, this begs two critical questions: Why
are banks more thickly staffed? And why do British banks, who
could combine their natural lending role with an equity stake and
thereby achieve monitoring synergies, hold so little equity?
1. Why Do Banks Invest in Monitoring?
Banks in Britain and other countries spend substantial resources
to monitor their loan portfolios.
One plausible reason relates to
liquidity. Bank loans, especially troubled loans, are much less liquid
than corporate equities. Lacking the ability to sell and cut their losses,
banks may be forced to invest heavily in monitoring and, equally
important, in organizational structures that are conducive to
monitoring.
Closely tied to illiquidity is informational asymmetry. Lack of
information about bank loans, especially the absence of a consensus
price, not only makes sale difficult, it also forces the seller to accept
a large discount on sale, to protect the buyer against the risk that the
seller will unload "problem" loans when the sale price exceeds the
loan's value. This is a classic "lemons" problem, in which high
quality loans cannot be sold for a fair price.
The gap between
potential sale price and actual value reduces the incentive to sell and
leaves more room for banks to add value through monitoring. It is no
accident that every major bank has a sizable workout department.
Third, the agent bank typically holds a substantial fraction of the
total loan for its own account. Even if the loan is largely syndicated,
the agent bank's reputation, and thus its ability to syndicate future
loans, depends on its monitoring success. Thus, both agency costs at
the investor level and collective action effects are reduced. Again,
the effect is to justify more monitoring.
Sandra A. Waddock, Ownership at a Distance: Implications of Activist Institutional Investors,
BUS. CONTEMP. WORLD, Spring 1990, at 83. Such a prediction, however, fails to "unpack" the
pension fund and see it as a pool of financial assets, nominally administered by trustees but
actually run by money managers located in merchant banks and insurers. Once the focus is shifted
to professional money managers, those managers' incentives to engage in collective action are
weaker, their conflicts of interest are stronger, and, as discussed in the next section, their ability
to acquire the monitoring capacity of a commercial bank is questionable.
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We are not alone in speculating that other institutions, who are
more natural equity holders, may be intrinsically weaker monitors.
R.E. Artus of Prudential has written:
My guess is that any conceivable increase in [shareholder] activity
will not . . . match[ ] that of the bank-based economies, since
share ownership unaccompanied by the additional involvement in
providing finance and other services will never provide the depth
of knowledge and commitment that arises with the combination of
banking and proprietary interests.194

2. Why Don't British Banks Hold More Equities?
British banks hold little equity.
They voluntarily forgo the
monitoring synergies that would arise if they held both debt and
equity in the same firm: holding both equity and debt increases
influence; the gains from oversight flow to both sets of holdings; and
substantial monitoring is already justified on the loan side.
One possible reason is that, like banks in many industrialized
economies, British banks combine thin equity — equity capital equal
to a small percentage of total assets — with a timing mismatch
between their assets and liabilities. That is, their assets, which are
chiefly loans, are illiquid, while most of their liabilities are short-term
deposits, often due on demand.195 Hence banks and their regulators
have to worry about "runs" — sudden mutually reinforcing decisions
by depositors to withdraw their funds.
A bank that holds large blocks of stock aggravates the timing
mismatch between its assets and liabilities by exposing itself to the
greater volatility of common stock.
For example, assume that a
British commercial bank held 20f its assets in stocks and had net
worth equal to 4% of its assets. In October 1987, when stocks
declined over 20% in one day in most major securities markets, such
a bank would have been rendered technically insolvent. Its total
assets, valued at market, would have fallen below its total liabilities.
Even without regulation, rational bank executives recognize this
danger and confine stock investments to a modest portion of the
bank's portfolio. Moreover, bear markets for stocks tend to correlate
with an increase in troubled loans — the bank gains little
diversification by holding this asset class.
Even so, British banks seem to display an overabundance of
caution. Their investments in equity securities today amount to under
194

Artus (1990), supra note 11, at 14.

195

See Coffee (1991), supra note 3, at 1318 -21.
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1% of their assets. This level has not risen since regulatory
restrictions were lifted in the 1970s.196 Indeed, as a historical matter,
the major London banks have never played a significant role — as
shareholders or as lenders — in major British corporations.197
German and Japanese banks have overcome the thin equity
hurdle. Why the difference? One possible explanation takes us back
to the political story and the likely importance of path dependence.
Banks are natural monitors because they must already monitor their
loans. But they can hold large, risky stock positions only if they
have a large equity base as a percentage of assets. If German and
Japanese banks — in part because of government encouragement198 —
became large stockholders early on and built their equity base as their
stockholdings grew in value, this situation could be stable for a
substantial period of time. Then, with the introduction of deposit
insurance later in this century in both Germany and Great Britain,
banks probably found it cheaper to raise capital from depositors than
from equity shareholders.199 In any event, after the appearance of
deposit insurance, bank depositors in both countries had less incentive
to demand that their banks maintain a substantial equity capital to
support their debt claims. As a result, the initial disparity between
the equity base of German banks and that of British banks may have
become locked in, as thin equity became a permanent characteristic of
British institutions seeking to raise capital at the lowest cost. In
addition, monitoring synergies are probably smaller today than in the
past because large companies are increasingly able to borrow in the
196

See supra Table 1.

197

See SCOTT (1986), supra note 101, at 2. Scott notes that local "country" banks outside
the metropolitan centers of Great Britain financed the infant companies that began the Industrial
Revolution. Id.
198
The evidence on the close involvement of German governmental and political forces in
the growth of Germany's universal banks is well known. See, e.g., RICHARD TILLY, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE RHINELAND 1815-1870 (1966); Richard H. Tilly,
German Banking, 1850-1914: Developmental Assistance for the Strong, 15 J. EUR. ECON. HIST.
113 (1986).
199

Deposit insurance arrived relatively late in both Germany and Great Britain. In Germany,
although the historical roots of deposit insurance date back to the 1930s, deposit insurance was
not extended to the large commercial banks before the late 1950s and early 1960s. Initially,
deposits were insured only up to a relatively low level (DM 10,000). Following the collapse of
the Herstatt Bank in 1974, Germany's private banks (which category includes its universal banks)
established a Deposit Protection Fund with greatly increased coverage that today insures virtually
100% of all deposits. See MARIA L. FRES- FELIX, DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES 31-37 (1991).
In Great Britain, deposit insurance is today mandatory with the creation of the Deposit Protection
Fund in 1982. The Fund is administered by the Bank of England and covers 75% of deposits of
up to £20,000 (effectively the Fund covers a maximum of £15,000). As in Germany, the creation
of this Fund was a response to banking failures in the 1970s. Id. at 39-40.
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public debt markets more cheaply than from banks.
From this perspective, there may have been a brief window
period early in this century when banks having a large equity base
could have exploited their position as joint holders of debt and equity.
Today, that moment seems to have passed, and the incremental value
from holding long-term equity stakes and engaging in active
monitoring would not justify building a costly equity base. More
recently, as public debt financing for corporations became more
widely available, British banks lost the potential monitoring synergy
from holding both debt and equity. Moreover, in Britain, insurers
were already large equity holders and moderately active monitors.
The insurers may already be capturing the easy gains from
monitoring. The question for banks is then whether the remaining
gains from more intense monitoring justify building large equity
holdings and taking the accompanying risk. They apparently think
not.
A second explanation for the larger equity holdings of Japanese
and German banks begins with the much closer relationship between
the major banks and the central government in both countries.
Germany has only three universal banks, which are too big for the
government to let fail. Being smaller, British banks are less assured
of a government bailout if the equity market sours and thus can take
less equity risk. In Japan, the risk of equity investments for banks is
limited both by an implicit government guarantee against bank failure
and by the alleged willingness of other members of the bank's
industrial group (keiretsu) to support the stock market prices of their
main bank and of the principal keiretsu members.200 Indeed, the stock
of most Japanese banks is held principally by others in the same
keiretsu, or other firms that the bank lends to, leaving only a small
public float.201 In such an environment, the willingness of Japanese
banks to hold large equity stakes could, in part, reflect keiretsu
members' ability to stabilize the market prices of keiretsu members.
Thus, Japanese banks may face a smaller risk of sudden stock price
declines than a Western bank making similarly large equity
investments.
200

See Marshall Auerback, Japan Inc.'s Days Are Numbered, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1991,

at A18.
201
At the end of 1989, the free float in most Japanese bank stocks was as low as 8% of the
outstanding shares. This lets keiretsu members support the market price of their main bank's stock
through relatively small additional purchases. Id. With the more recent decline in Japanese stock
prices, this reciprocal system of price support has come under increasing strain, and it will be
instructive to see if Japanese banks reduce either the size of their equity stakes or their total stock
investments.
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The organizational change that would be needed for British
commercial banks to become serious equity investors may also
dissuade them. The required transformation seems easily as great as
that which trading- oriented merchant banks would have to undergo to
become long-term investors. Perhaps too, there are gains to holding
large stakes with corresponding influence, but only small gains to
holding smaller, less influential 1%-3% stakes. In such a world,
banks with puny equity holdings will see much risk and little gain
from increasing these holdings.
Pulling these pieces together, we believe that it is probably too
late for British banks to become large equity holders. Perhaps the
opportunity would have existed in the past, in a more inviting
regulatory climate or perhaps banks will become large equity holders
only with an affirmative regulatory shove, as was apparently the case
in Japan and Germany.202 On this we can only speculate. But for
British banks, the window of opportunity, if it was ever open, now
seems firmly shut and unlikely to open again.
VI. IMPLICATIONS: WHAT THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE MEANS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
The heavily institutionalized British securities market may offer a
preview of what American securities markets will look like in a
decade or so. What then does current British experience predict for
the United States? To address this question, one needs to break it
down into several component parts:
(1) What level of coordinated activity among institutional
investors appears likely in the United States if the level of
institutional ownership continues to rise?
(2) If Glass-Steagall and similar legislation were repealed or
relaxed, would American banks become large equity holders and
active monitors, like the German "universal" banks or the Japanese
"main" banks?
(3) To what degree is institutional investor behavior path
dependent — shaped and constrained as much by the limited
mutability of existing organizations as by external factors, such as
regulation?
(4) If American banks and insurers remain largely passive, can
American mutual funds or pension funds fill the corporate governance
role played by Japanese and German banks and by British insurers?

202
See Roe (1993), supra note 7, at 1955 -56, 1971-72; TILLY (1966), supra note 198; Tilly
(1986), supra note 198.
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(5) What changes in U.S. regulation would prompt American
institutions, taken as a whole, to act as British institutions now do?
(6) What can the British experience tell us about the desirability
of those regulatory changes?
A. How Will Institutional Cooperation Evolve in the United States?

An initial question is whether the United States, if it approaches
\
British levels of institutional ownership, will also approach British
levels of institutional activism. The probable answer is no. Several
factors seem likely to dampen U.S. oversight relative to British
oversight.
First, U.S. institutions are unlikely to approach the level of
concentration or the geographic and cultural cohesion of the City,
where contact among institutional investors is constant.
Lower
concentration means that coalitions of U.S. institutional investors will
have to have more members to aggregate the same percentage of
stock. Yet the British experience suggests that keeping group size to
a minimum is important in reducing coordination costs. Moreover,
for a given level of ownership concentration, the City's geographic
and cultural cohesion reduces coordination costs. Thus, coordination
costs seem likely to remain lower in Britain than in the United
States.
Second, the British experience highlights the importance of fund
managers' incentives.
British institutions look to those who are
overweighted in a stock to organize a shareholder coalition. It has
often been claimed that as institutional investors hold larger stakes in
corporations, they will naturally become more active investors.203 The
British experience, however, suggests that fund managers focus more
on relative performance than absolute performance.
American
institutions, like their British counterparts, may be less willing to join
coalitions or to take collective action because their success will
benefit others as much or more as themselves. In short, a large
stakeholder will not necessarily be an active investor, even apart from
conflicts of interest or regulatory constraints.
Third, British institutions' leverage over corporate managements
is in considerable measure the product of their ability to collectively
decline to participate in a subscription offering. This market weapon
203
See, e.g., Black (1990), supra note 2, at 575 - 84 (developing a model in which
shareholder activism increases with the size of shareholdings).
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has strong advantages over the proxy contest, which requires money
managers to bear large direct and indirect costs.
American
institutions lack a comparable weapon. Preemptive rights are optional
under most state corporate statutes and are rarely found among large
U.S. firms. Moreover, the effectiveness of refusal to subscribe as a
shareholder strategy increases with concentration of shareholdings and
requires mutual trust among the large institutions that a promise not
to subscribe will be honored, despite the short-term gains from
subscribing or selling one's rights.
Fourth, as we discuss in section VI.C, it seems unlikely that U.S.
banks or insurers will quickly become active shareholders even if the
remaining regulatory barriers disappeared tomorrow. There is reason
to doubt whether American mutual funds or pension funds will be
willing, or can easily develop the institutional capability, to serve the
role that British insurers now play.
Fifth, important regulatory differences exist between the two
countries. In particular, U.S. law forbids institutions from acting
jointly in the quiet, behind-the-scenes fashion that is typical in
Britain.204 Thus far, American institutions are mostly unwilling to
make the public Schedule 13D filing that must accompany any voting
or cost-sharing agreement among shareholders holding 5% or more of
a company's stock.205 Still, because these rules are deeply intertwined
with the American preference for sunlight and market transparency,
only limited relaxations of them seem likely. Moreover, Americanstyle litigiousness has not yet penetrated the British corporate
landscape. A British institution's effort to change management is
unlikely to involve heavy legal bills.
B. Can Regulation Explain Bank and Insurer Behavior?
The British example sheds light on a central question: What
role does legal regulation play in fostering the passivity of American
banks and insurers?
In the United States, bank and insurance
regulation discourages or prohibits significant stock ownership; in
Britain, these regulatory obstacles are absent. If a web of regulation
has pacified American banks and insurers, as the political model of
American corporate governance predicts, then similar but less
204

See generally id. (describing securities law constraints on American financial
institutions).
205
See, e.g., Robert Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140, 145 (Pozen, a managing director of Fidelity Investments, advises
that: "At the end of [a conversation on a voting proposal], both parties should state clearly that
they will not be voting together or buying or selling securities together.").
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regulated British institutions should be active investors, holding large
stakes and perhaps paralleling the activities of large Japanese and
German banks. Conversely, if regulatory controls do not explain
investor behavior, one might expect British investors to behave much
like their American brethren.
The British evidence fits neither pattern well. British institutions
are more active than their American counterparts.
Regulatory
differences may explain some of this difference. However, regulation
cannot explain the very different behavior of different classes of
British institutions. British insurance companies have traditionally
been the most active investors in the United Kingdom, but British
banks hold almost no British equities. Why the difference?
We have already explored the possible reasons why British banks
did not become large shareholders. Insurers are potentially subject to
similar problems, but British insurers are substantial equity investors.
A closer look at British insurers shows how they have avoided the
thin equity problem of the banks. First, insurance company creditors
— that is, policyholders — can be locked into their investments,
through sales loads, up-front commissions, and liquidation penalties,
to a greater degree than bank depositors. Thus, the risk of a sudden
massive withdrawal of funds is reduced.206 More importantly, British
insurance companies developed techniques by which to pass equity
risk to their policyholders. British insurers first began to invest
heavily in equities during the 1930s.207 This movement was led by
the mutual insurers, whose policyholders, who were also in effect
their shareholders, bore the equity risk.208 In time, the joint-stock
insurers copied the mutuals' success by designing financial products
with variable returns based on market performance.
Since the mid-nineteenth century, life insurance has been a
popular form of retirement savings in Britain, particularly among the
working class.209 With the explosive growth in retirement savings
206

Although runs on insurance companies are rare, they do occur. See, e.g., Best's
Insolvency Study: Life/Health Insurers 1976 -1991, BEST'S REV., June 1992, at 18, 130 (stating
that policyholder runs precipitated the collapse of Executive Life and Mutual Benefit Life in
1991).
207

SCOTT (1986), supra note 101, at 88 - 89.
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As of 1951, some mutual insurers had 30% of their assets invested in stocks, while jointstock insurers had only 10% of their assets similarly invested. Id. at 89. This suggests that
market-volatility risk inhibited stock ownership, a factor that would apply even more strongly to
banks.
209

Id.
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after World War II,210 U.K. life insurers were flush with cash and
increased their stakes in British corporations. By the mid-1950s,
Prudential, for example, held 5% or larger stakes in a number of the
largest British corporations.211
Banks, in contrast, were not the natural repository for
individuals' long- term retirement savings. Perhaps as a result, they
have never designed financial products that pass along or share the
equity risk of stock investments with their depositors. Yet, for at
least the last fifteen years, there has been no regulatory barrier to
banks' developing such products. The obvious explanation is one of
industry specialization: insurers provide these products, and banks
have no comparative advantage.212
To understand the British mix of activism and passivity, it is not
enough to explain why British insurers hold stock and British banks
do not. We must also seek to understand why the large British
insurers — notably Prudential, Norwich Union, and Legal & General
— are among the most activist U.K. institutions, while many pension
fund managers with portfolios of similar size are less active. The
insurers appear to be less constrained by the costs of activism that
loomed large for many of the fund managers that we interviewed.
Here, it may be important that insurance companies are "true" owners
of a substantial portion of their portfolios.
A hypothesis: Institutions, like British insurers, who both own
substantial equity stakes for their own account and manage funds for
others, will more readily conclude that expenditures on corporate
governance are in the interests of those whom they serve as
fiduciaries than will institutions who invest almost exclusively on
behalf of others. It is, after all, a conclusion that meshes with their
own self-interest, because it allows them to spread costs among
others receiving benefits.
In this, British insurers look at least
somewhat similar to German universal banks, who own significant
equity stakes and hold and vote even greater equity investments as
fiduciaries for individual customers. At the same time, the historical
evolution and comparative freedom from regulation of British insurers
may explain why they hold more stock for their own account and are
much more active than American insurers.
210

See Davies (1994), supra note 8, at 258-61.
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SCOTT (1986), supra note 101, at 89-90.
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In the United States, life insurance annuities receive favorable tax treatment that is not
available to banks offering similar products. See I.R.C. §§ 805, 808, 815 (1988). We do not
know whether British tax law similarly favors insurers.
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C. Path Dependence
Path dependence in the evolution of financial institutions, we
have suggested, is important in understanding why British banks own
almost no stock and play a trivial role in British corporate
governance, in sharp contrast to German and Japanese banks. Path
dependence will likely also be critical in shaping the future course of
American corporate governance, even if legal barriers to shareholder
action are reduced. In the United States, as in Britain, the time when
banks were major lenders to large corporations has passed. In the
United States, as in Britain, other institutions have filled, at least in
part, the corporate governance vacuum left by the banks' absence. In
the United States, as in Britain, the dominant source of the funds that
financial institutions manage is retirement savings, primarily through
pension plans. Finally, in the United States, even more than in Great
Britain, the existence of mandatory deposit insurance is likely to
reduce any interest U.S. banks might have in developing the equitycapital base necessary to support substantial equity investments.
In the United States, as in Britain, then, financial institution
involvement in corporate governance is likely to involve a small role
for commercial banks and a large role for the institutions that manage
retirement savings — corporate pension plans, public pension plans,
and outside money managers for these plans. But over the long term,
the dominant players are difficult to discern. Today, pension funds
loom large. Public and private pensions together hold around 30% of
all U.S. equities and around 60% of all equities held by financial
institutions. Public pension plans are vocal, while corporate pension
plans are mostly passive — partly because they are controlled by
corporate managers. For reasons unrelated to corporate governance,
defined contribution and 401(k) plans have grown rapidly, partly at
the expense of defined benefit pension plans. Defined contribution
and 401(k) plan growth, in turn, has helped to fuel the growth of the
major mutual fund complexes that are the natural repositories for
investment of employee-directed pension assets. It is possible that
mutual fund groups, through a combination of individual accounts
and corporate-derived pension accounts, will have the size to play at
least a coequal role with public pension plans in American corporate
governance twenty years hence — if they choose to.
American insurers seem unlikely to approach the role played by
British insurers. Direct regulatory limits on insurers holding stock
have largely disappeared, but net capital rules still limit insurers'
shareholdings. Perhaps more importantly, a high-cost sales apparatus,
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developed to sell individual life insurance policies, impedes the
insurers' effort to capture individual retirement assets. The cost of an
army of insurance agents drags down the returns on variable
annuities, compared to competing mutual funds, while the tax deferral
benefits available through 401(k) plans substantially offset the
deferral offered by life insurance policies.
Path dependence may help to explain the uphill battle that
American insurers now face in competing with mutual funds and
private pension managers. When British insurers, beginning in the
1930s, were developing variable annuities and reaping the advantages
that accrue to the first mover in collecting household retirement
funds, American insurers could not hold stock. They developed a
sales structure and institutional expertise appropriate to the fixedpayoff products they could sell. By the time the insurers could
become major equity players, pension fund managers and mutual
funds had captured the lion's share of the variable-payoff market.
If we are unsure which American financial institutions will be
the most significant, we can be even less confident in predicting how
they might behave in a less-regulated environment. Mutual funds, for
example, began as trading and stock-picking institutions. Mutual
fund groups arose later, because of economies of scale in servicing
large numbers of individual accounts and economies of scope in onestop shopping for different types of mutual funds. Today, the major
fund groups combine centralized account administration and
marketing with decentralized stock-picking. One Fidelity fund might
be buying the same stock that two others are selling. With rare
exceptions, the individual funds within a group are too small to have
much influence on the companies they invest in.
Mutual fund influence must flow primarily from the aggregated
holdings of the multiple funds in an affiliated group. But most
mutual funds today lack that level of coordination. Will the potential
profits from monitoring, shared across the funds in a fund group,
justify the organizational innovation needed to capture these profits?
For corporate governance initiatives, the profit opportunity is subtle,
hard to quantify, shared with one's competitors, and impeded by
regulatory barriers. Under those circumstances, mutual fund groups,
whose institutional structure developed when oversight of corporate
managers was not a realistic possibility, could fail to adapt to this
new business opportunity, even if the opportunity is real. Moreover,
because mutual funds invest strictly as agents, and not for their own
account, their strong concern with relative performance could dampen

2084

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 92:1994

their incentive to invest on oversight, much as concern with relative
performance explains the passivity of underweighted British
institutions. We will simply have to wait and see.
D. International Convergence

One finds recurring hints, in the British experience, that we
may be in the early stages of an international convergence in
institutional behavior. Capital flows and financial institutions are
increasingly international in scope. As financial institutions expand
their international presence, they are increasingly exposed both to
different expectations as to how they will act and to competition
from other institutions with different histories.
For example, vocal shareholder activism, American style, is
both being brought to other countries by American institutions and
piquing interest among foreign institutions.213
We have already
discussed the efforts by Fidelity Investments at Brown & Jackson
and WPP.
Conversely, Japanese- or German-style long-term
relational investing, and British-style informal discussions with
management, are piquing American interest.
As U.S. institutions buy and vote more foreign shares, they
appear to be inducing change in the traditional British practice of not
bothering to vote. British institutions are finding that if they do not
vote, foreign-held shares will carry disproportionate weight in the
final tally. Institutions accustomed to voting are complaining about
the weighted-voting schemes that are common in Europe, though it is
to early to tell how effective such complaints will be.214
Regulatory convergence is chancier than cultural convergence
because it will be mediated by local politics, but some convergence is
already occurring. Examples include the worldwide net capital rules
for commercial banks adopted by the Bank for International
Settlements; British adoption of elements of the strong disclosure
rules that have long been a part of U.S. securities regulation; and the
Cadbury Committee recommendation, patterned on U.S. and Canadian
213

See, e.g., Cohen (1993), supra note 125, at 12; Melcher & Oster (1993), supra note 41;
Roger Miles, Stirrings of Activism in the U.K., GEORGESON REP. (Georgeson & Co., New York,
N.Y.), Summer 1993, at 5.
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practice, that public firms have
exclusively of outside directors.215

audit
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composed

E. Is British-Style Intervention Desirable?
We have suggested above that the United States will not easily
achieve even the British level of oversight of corporate managers by
major financial institutions. But the United States has moved in that
direction though proxy reform, and could surely move further through
additional legal reform. What insight does the British experience
shed on the desirability of that reform?
On the whole, from an American perspective, the British corporate
governance model seems moderately attractive. The procedural and
structural steps that British institutional shareholders have taken, such
as discouraging dual-class voting structures, preserving preemptive
rights, and pressing for separation of the posts of chairman and chief
executive, seem sensible. Crisis-driven, company-specific intervention
is unlikely to cause harm to already well-run companies.
Thus,
concerns that financial institutions will meddle in ordinary business
decisions seem ill-founded. The institutions have neither the time nor,
as they are quick to point out, the expertise. Even in a crisis, British
institutions are reluctant to boot out the old managers until they have
found a promising successor.
Moreover, this intervention seems directed at a class of firms
whose problems are not effectively addressed by takeovers. Although
replacing inefficient management is an important motive in at least
some takeovers,216 seriously troubled firms tend not to become targets,
at least in Britain.217 Perhaps, uncertainty about just how bad these
firms' problems are and whether an outsider can fix them is too great
for a raider to make a hostile bid.
To be sure, British industry, taken as a whole, is not usually held
out as a shining example of economic success. But that may merely
show that other factors matter more than corporate governance in
determining a country's overall economic success. We can still learn
from the British in the corporate governance area — where they have
apparently had moderate success with a system not so different from
ours.
215
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VII. CONCLUSION: THE HALF-FULL GLASS
U.K. institutions are more involved in corporate governance than
their U.S. counterparts.
This is one central conclusion from our
research.
But institutional activity in the United Kingdom is still
constrained by the costs associated with forming and maintaining
shareholder coalitions and the limited incentives of money managers to
invest in monitoring. Thus, the British experience suggests two lessons
for the United States: (i) Reduce regulatory controls and institutional
investors will become more active; and (ii) reduce regulatory controls
and other constraints will surface that preclude radical change. One
can debate, we suppose, whether the glass of water is half full or half
empty. We are content with observing that, when regulatory inhibitions
are relaxed, the glass is neither full nor empty.
Moreover, the conventional wisdom that institutional investors in
the British market-centered system are significantly less involved in
corporate governance than major banks in bank-centered systems like
Japan and Germany may not be accurate. Oversight could plausibly be
more thorough in bank-centered systems, because the banks have a
larger investment and can realize economies of scale in their dual role
as both an equity and a debt monitor. But Japanese and German
banks, like British financial institutions, are slow to intervene unless a
client corporation is in serious trouble. Conflicts of interest and mutual
back-scratching can also constrain monitoring within the bank-centered
systems. How different the level of actual oversight is between bankcentered and market-centered systems remains uncertain.218
We may be discovering, in the British experience, a different kind
of inherent limit on shareholder monitoring of management — not the
complete passivity announced by Berle and Means and based on the
separation of ownership and control, but rather the reluctance of even
large shareholders to intervene, based on imperfect information, limited
institutional capabilities, substantial coordination costs, the misaligned
incentives of money managers, a preference for liquidity, and the
uncertain benefits of intervention. Agency costs at the fund-manager
level may be no less important than at the corporate-manager level,
with the fund manager focused more on performance relative to its
rivals than on absolute performance. Coordination costs persist even
when financial intermediaries aggregate large blocks of stock so as to
possess the "clout" that the Berle-Means shareholder lacks.
218
Cf. J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 102 YALE
L.J. 2005, 2010 -11 (1993) (questioning whether "Japanese main banks do significantly more
[monitoring] than other banks elsewhere").
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As a result, shareholder oversight of corporate managers will
always be a matter of more or less and will need supplementation by
other constraints. Installing a strong board is, no doubt, a central
shareholder task, but it is no panacea: the most able directors often
have other full-time jobs; corporate officers control the information that
flows to the board; small-group dynamics and consensus
decisionmaking inhibit fast action. Agency theorists might say: We
could have told you so.
How much shareholder oversight, and what kind of oversight,
would occur in a less-regulated U.S. market? We see no determinate
answers to this question. Instead, the evolution of a corporate
governance system, within any given set of legal constraints, is likely
overdetermined.
At the same time, the multiple constraints on
oversight give us confidence that deregulation to permit American
institutions to act more like their British counterparts will not unleash
massive, misguided institutional meddling in corporate affairs. Quite
the opposite — the British are far more concerned with getting their
large institutions to pay attention to corporate governance than with
stopping them from intervening too much. Moreover, there are severe
constraints on the mutability of financial institutions.
What U.S.
financial institutions can do depends on what they have done, or not
done, in the past. In all likelihood, U.S. institutions will remain less
active than their British counterparts for some time to come.

